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Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to gain a better understanding of how institutions, whether formal or 
informal, influence individual- and societal-level economic choices, especially in the Muslim-
majority countries. It consists of six research papers that contribute to the economic analysis of 
institutions. The first paper, published in the Journal of World Intellectual Property in 2011, 
investigates the relationship between intellectual property piracy and religiosity in several 
Muslim-majority countries. The second paper, published in Constitutional Political Economy in 
2013, focuses on the future of constitutionalism in Arab Spring countries by analyzing a unique 
Islamic constitution from a rule of law perspective. Another paper published in a collective 
volume tackles the relationship between business ethics and economic systems in Muslim-
majority countries. The fourth paper is a novel application of economic analysis to Islamic 
criminal law, as it analyzes the marginal deterrence in Islamic criminal law of theft. The fifth 
paper, which is currently under second round review from Journal of Economics and Statistics, 
empirically investigates the relationship between the religiously induced internalized values of 
individuals in 78 countries and their specific attitudes toward corruption using World Value 
Survey data. In the sixth and final paper of my dissertation, I empirically investigate the long-
term relationship between the legacy of slavery and contemporary violent crime in USA.  
 
Paper 1 (with Nora El-Bialy): “Can Shari’a be a Deterrent for Intellectual Property Piracy in 
Islamic Countries?” examines the stance of Islamic legal traditions (Shari’a) towards intellectual 
property (IP) piracy. Although Muslims may differ on what Shari’a dictates, most of them view 
Shari’a as God’s law and as a main ingredient of Islamic belief system. Since piracy rates in 
Muslim-majority countries are considerably high in light of existing formal IPR laws, it becomes 
essential to test if Shari’a has any relation with such phenomenon. Our hypothesis is that, 
although Muslim countries have formal institutions or laws that protect intellectual property 
rights (IPR), little attention is given to informal institutions, or human morals, regarding IPR 
piracy, which negatively affects the enforcement level of IPR laws in these countries. Muslims 
may not be convinced that IPR violations, although illegal, are unethical or forbidden by Islamic 
Shari’a. In order to test the level of adherence of Muslims to Shari’a to support our hypothesis, 
we develop a “religious loyalty” index (RLI). Comparing adherence of followers of different 
religions with those of Islam, Muslim countries have the highest religiosity level, positively 
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affecting obedience level to Shari’a. Consequently, an investigation of how Shari’a views IPR 
piracy is conducted. As Islam generally prohibits IPR piracy, the study concludes by offering a 
set of policy recommendations that can effectively help in minimizing IPR piracy in Muslim 
countries. 
 
Paper 2: “Islamic Constitutionalism and Rule of Law: A Constitutional Economics Perspective” 
investigates the relationship between constitutionalism from an Islamic perspective and the 
concept of rule of law. Al Azhar, one of the oldest and most respected Sunni religious 
institutions in the world, developed an Islamic constitution with the purpose of making it 
“available to any country that wishes to model itself after the Islamic Shari’a”. Facing the 
differences among Islamic sects, Al-Azhar’s constitution preamble states that “the principles laid 
down in this constitution agree with those shared between the Islamic schools of law to the 
utmost extent possible”. Since its completion in 1978, this Islamic constitution received little 
attention from policy makers in Muslim-majority countries as well as legal scholars worldwide. 
Only after the January 25 uprising did Islamic political movements in Egypt announce their 
desire to use this constitution as their proposed model for the upcoming Egyptian constitution. 
 
Having this in mind, this study uses this constitution as a model of Islamic constitutionalism, 
whereby its stance regarding rule of law is examined using six main principles: (1) separation of 
powers, (2) clear and stable laws, (3) judicial independence and judicial review, (4) equal access 
to justice, (5) the state is bound by the law, and (6) protection of basic human rights. I find the 
Al-Azhar’s constitution to be incompatible with essential concepts of rule of law. For example, 
the powers vested in the head of the Islamic state are enormous, making the executive branch of 
government far superior to the legislative and judicial branches. Women and non- Muslims are 
explicitly discriminated against throughout the constitution. Moreover, laws stemming from this 
constitution are not stable since many differences exist among schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh). Consequently, we show that state-of-the-art Islamic constitutionalism lacks essential 
components needed in any constitution based on rule of law. 
 
Paper 3 (with Helmut Leipold): “Wirtschaftsethik und Wirtschaftssysteme in islamischen 
Ländern” investigates if the Islamic ethics related to business and economics could offer a 
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solution to deter future financial crises. For this purpose, we investigate the principles of Islamic 
business ethics and Islamic business law. Our analysis shows that the principles of Islamic 
economic ethics resemble the objectives of the social market economy model. We further 
comparatively analyze the economic systems of members of the Organization of the Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC). Although Islamic countries have heterogeneous economic structures, we 
perceive that they are somewhat homogenous in their lack of democracy and their low levels of 
rule of law. Moreover, the majority of Islamic countries can be categorized as rentier states. This 
is not surprising in countries where religion and state are in close alliance. The paper concludes 
that the principles of Islamic economic ethics do not offer a specific solution to prevent future 
financial crises.  
 
Paper 4: “Stealing more is better? An Economic Analysis of Islamic Law of Theft” is the very 
first attempt towards applying economic analysis to Islamic criminal law. Islamic criminal law 
offers two main punishments regarding theft; hadd, a fixed penalty that requires the amputation 
of the offender’s right hand under certain conditions and ta’zir, a punishment that is left to the 
discretion of the judge and is less severe than hadd. Deterrence is one of the main objectives for 
Islamic criminal law. However, from the viewpoint of marginal deterrence and multiplier 
principles, lesser crimes with low social harm are punished severely with hadd while crimes with 
high social harm are punished with ta’zir. Moreover, as the probability of detection and sanction 
is less in crimes of high social harm, criminals would have better incentive to commit the latter 
type of crimes. This study implies that if Islamic criminal law is introduced in Arab Spring 
countries in its current form, crimes of high social cost are likely to become more frequent. A 
call for a modern reinterpretation and re-coding of Islamic criminal law of theft is essential for 
any successful attempt to apply Shari’a in Muslim-majority countries. 
 
Paper 5 (with Sang-Min Park): “Religious Loyalty and Acceptance of Corruption” investigates 
the relationship between religiously-induced internalized values of individuals and their specific 
attitudes regarding the acceptance of corruption. The dataset on which our study is based was 
collected by the World Values Survey from 164,209 individuals in 80 countries surveyed during 
a period of 13 years. We propose that individual attitudes towards corruption and religion are 
associated given certain societal and institutional contexts. Our results show that although there 
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is a negative and statistically significant effect of religiosity on the acceptance of corruption on 
the individual level, this effect is small. We find that there is a threshold value of religiosity 
below which corruption is more easily accepted by individuals. Our interpretation for this result 
is simple: individuals with minimal religiosity are generally less constrained by religious norms; 
specifically, religious norms that are opposed to corruption are less binding on these individuals, 
resulting in them having a greater propensity to accept corruption. Religiosity, therefore, does 
lower the acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds a certain threshold for a specific 
individual. 
 
Paper 6: “The Long-Term Effect of Slavery on Violent Crime: Evidence from US Counties” is 
the first to empirically investigate the long-term relationship between slavery and violence in 
USA. Although qualitative evidence shows that slavery has been a key factor behind the 
prevalence of violence, especially in South USA (Cash, 1941; Franklin, 1956; Gastil, 1971; 
Wyatt-Brown, 1986), no empirical evidence supports this claim so far. I propose that the 
proportion of slaves in a certain county in 1860 is positively correlated with the rate of violent 
crimes in 2000. As violence was extensively used to control slaves for hundreds of years, a 
culture of violence was formed and persisted through time. Extending Engermann and Sokoloff’s 
hypotheses (1997; 2002), I empirically examine two hypotheses: (1) slavery has a long-term 
effect on violent crime. (2) Such long-term effect is mainly transmitted through inequality. The 
results show that slavery in 1860 is positively associated with violent crime in 2000. Testing the 
second hypothesis, I find that land inequality in 1860 has a long-term significant effect on 
contemporary violent crime. 
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Stealing more is better? An Economic Analysis of Islamic Law 
of Theft 
 
Abstract: 
This study is the first attempt towards applying economic analysis to Islamic criminal law. 
Islamic criminal law offers two main punishments regarding theft; hadd, a fixed penalty that 
requires the amputation of the offender’s right hand under certain conditions and ta’zir, a 
punishment that is left to the discretion of the judge and is less severe than hadd. Deterrence is 
one of the main objectives for Islamic criminal law. However, from the viewpoint of marginal 
deterrence and multiplier principles, lesser crimes with low social harm are punished severely 
with hadd while crimes with high social harm are punished with ta’zir. Moreover, as the 
probability of detection and sanction is less in crimes of high social harm, criminals would have 
better incentive to commit the latter type of crimes. This study implies that if Islamic criminal 
law is introduced in Arab Spring countries in its current form, crimes of high social cost are 
likely to become more frequent. A call for a modern reinterpretation and re-coding of Islamic 
criminal law of theft is essential for any successful attempt to apply Shari’a in Islamic countries. 
 
JEL classification: K14; Z12; P40; K00. 
 
Keywords: Islam, Criminal Law, Economics of Crime, Deterrence, Hadd, Ta'zir, Shari'a, Theft. 
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1. Introduction 
As democracy is bringing more political Islam into the scene in the countries of the Arab Spring, 
it becomes apparent that Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt in particular will play a significant role 
in the developing of post-revolutionary constitutions, significantly changing these countries’ 
legal setup. Beaumont (2011) argues that political Islam is bound to dominate Arab spring 
countries, while Manthorpe (2011) notes that Arab spring looks more like an Islamic revolution. 
This is, to a certain extent, unsurprising as Islamic societies are believed to be very keen to 
follow the teachings of their religion. El-Bialy and Gouda (2011) develop a Religious Loyalty 
Index (RLI) to capture the religiosity of different societies and find that Islamic societies are the 
most adherent to religion. The Economist (2011a) states that “Islam is bound to play a larger role 
in government in the Arab world than elsewhere. Most Muslims do not believe in the separation 
of religion and state, as America and France do, and have not lost their enthusiasm for religion, 
as many “Christian Democrats” in Europe have.” In another article, the Economist (2011b) 
argues that the full implementation of Islamic Law (Shari’a) is one of the dominant demands of 
Islamic parties in Arab Spring countries. Schacht (1964) argues that law could be considered the 
most important element in the struggle which is being fought in Islam between traditionalism and 
modernism under the impact of Western Ideas.  
Such demands started to materialize in Egypt as a member of parliament from the Salafi-oriented 
Nour Party proposed to apply Islamic criminal law for crimes of overt robbery, murder, and 
forcible taking of property with a weapon. In case this call had made its way to the Egyptian 
legislation, punishments of these crimes would have included crucifixion and cutting the hands 
and legs of offenders (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012). Such punishments may seem harsh from the 
viewpoint of international human rights standards. However, in a recent survey, Pew Research 
Center (2010, p. 14) finds that the majority of Muslims in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Nigeria 
are in favor of making harsh punishments, such as stoning people who commit adultery, part of 
the law in their country (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Percentage of Muslims favoring Harsh Punishments 
 
Stoning people who 
commit adultery 
Whippings/cutting off of 
hands for theft and robbery 
Death penalty for people who 
leave the Muslim religion 
Turkey 16 13 5 
Egypt 82 77 84 
Jordan 70 58 86 
Lebanon 23 13 6 
Indonesia 42 36 30 
Pakistan 82 82 76 
Nigeria 56 65 51 
Source: Pew Research Center (2010), Question 108b-d 
 
This study provides an economic analysis of Islamic criminal laws, a subset of shari’a, with 
regards to theft. Economic analysis of crime, first introduced by Becker (1968), assumes that a 
prospective offender’s decision to commit a certain offense is based on rational decision-making. 
A deterrence theory is proposed based on the concept that, if the expected cost committing a 
certain crime for a potential offender offsets its expected benefit, this offender will be deterred 
from committing the crime. The two key components for increasing the size of the expected 
costs of committing a certain crime are the probability of apprehension (and conviction) and the 
severity of the punishment imposed on the criminal upon successful conviction. Developing such 
notion further, Craswell (1999, S. 2189) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) argue that the efficient 
deterrence of crime is achieved when the expected sanction regarding a certain crime equals the 
social harm caused by this specific crime. Such concept is called the multiplier principle. 
Deterrence theory resurged in recent decades among some criminologists who have chosen to 
adopt a new and more conservative outlook towards what should be done about crime (Eve, 
Segal, & Stevens, 2008). Indeed, it can be said that deterrence theory was and still is the 
“philosophical foundation for modern Western criminal law and criminal justice systems” 
(Akers, 2000, p. 17). As western legal institutions have been developed through a significantly 
different social, political and economic context than Islamic legal institutions, it can be of 
interest to examine the significance of deterrence theory in the Islamic legal context especially 
that related to the penal code of theft.  
Islamic criminal law remains under-researched in western legal literature
1
. This study is the first 
to apply concepts of economic analysis on Islamic criminal law. Earlier studies tackling Islamic 
criminal law can be divided into two categories; those written by legal scholars aimed to analyze 
                                                          
1
 The study of Peters (2005) remains the major work on Islamic criminal law in western legal literature. 
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certain aspects of this law from an entirely legal perspective, and those written by Muslim 
scholars aimed to provide a theological point of view concerning these laws. Rupp (2008) 
conducts a comprehensive meta-analysis of law and economics literature dealing with crime and 
deterrence and, out of the 700 investigated studies, not a single one is concerned with Islamic 
law. To our best knowledge, law and economics literature did not deal with Islamic criminal law 
so far. Consequently, our study aims to make the first attempt to fill this gap in literature
2
  
Islamic criminal law defines a certain set of conditions for a crime to be considered a theft. In 
case these conditions are fulfilled, the theft falls under the category of severe crimes (hadd) -
which is comparable to a felony under a western legal system - and a harsh punishment of 
amputation of the criminal’s right hand is applied. If the crime does not meet the conditions set 
by Muslim scholars for a theft, it is considered a lesser crime (ta’zir), comparable to a 
misdemeanor, and is generally punished in a more lenient way and under the discretion of the 
judge. Our analysis shows that Islamic criminal law focuses on the aspect of general deterrence 
where, given a certain risk of detection, any prospective offender is threatened by the severe 
punishment of committing a crime. Therefore, crime would decrease as the cost of committing a 
crime outweighs its benefit for a given offender in this society.  
Nevertheless, Islamic law does not take into consideration the concept of marginal deterrence 
where an offender chooses to commit a certain crime from a set of possible crimes. For example, 
stealing a wallet from an individual is considered a hadd crime and is punished by amputation of 
the right hand while stealing any amount of money from state treasury or embezzling from 
entrusted property are considered crimes that fall under the more lenient ta’zir category. Ta’zir 
penalty is left to the judge’s own discretion but should not reach the severity of hadd 
punishment. We also find that punishment negatively correlates with the social cost and severity 
of the crime in Islamic law of theft. Such legal setup would induce potential offenders to commit 
more serious and lucrative crimes than petty crimes at a high economic cost for society.  
This inefficient legal setup persists even when we consider the probability of detection and 
punishment associated with different crimes. The probability of detection is higher in the case of 
theft, a manifest crime, than in the case of embezzlement, a non-manifest crime, for the same 
                                                          
2
 Although this is the case with Islamic law, we base our analysis on the study of Garoupa and Gomez (2008) on 
Roman law. We find that Islamic criminal law intersects with Roman law on many fundamental aspects.  
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level of resources invested in apprehension and punishment. Additionally, as the sanction for 
manifest theft in Islam is more severe than non-manifest embezzlement, this violates the 
multiplier principle and the law becomes inefficient. The reason behind such an uncommon legal 
setup is that the Islamic criminal law was mainly developed in archaic times when private 
property was viewed worthy of more protection than public property. The study tries to call the 
attention of Muslim jurists and scholars to these fundamental problems before such legal system 
is applied in any contemporary society. 
As the first paper to offer economic analysis to Islamic criminal law, we first present an outlook 
on Islamic criminal law, especially that related to theft. Arabic primary sources are used 
whenever possible and special attention is given to contemporary sources of Islamic criminal 
law. The reason for this approach is straightforward: Muslim jurists generally argue that Islamic 
laws can be modified to suit the relevant time and place. As the body of Islamic law was mainly 
comprised between the 8
th
 to the 10
th
 century CE, it is expected that Islamic law corresponds to 
this specific era, rendering such a legal system obsolete. Consequently, citing archaic literature 
can be seen as a redundant task. According to Hallaq (1984), Muslim jurists ceaselessly strive 
towards extrapolating new legal directives that harmonize Islamic law with existing social, legal, 
political and economic norms, internationally and locally. Therefore, it is assumed that modern 
literature of Islamic law, which we heavily depend on through this study, reflects the state-of-
the-art in Islamic criminal law. 
The actual enforcement of Islamic criminal law on theft varies across different Islamic states, 
ranging from the strict Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan to the more lenient Egypt, Tunisia 
and Morocco. With this taken into consideration, much effort was exerted collecting data on 
legal cases in Islamic countries, allowing for a comparison between de jure and de facto 
enforcement of Islamic criminal law. Unfortunately, Islamic countries, especially those applying 
Islamic criminal law in its strictest sense, hardly publish any data on crimes and punishments, 
thus making any intentions to provide a more ‘rigorous’ analysis of the actual implementation of 
Islamic criminal law, and its deterring effect, futile. Also, possible discrepancies between Sunni 
and Shiite sects on punishments set for theft may be found. After investigating various Sunni and 
Shiite sources, it can be said that these two sects share most provisions regarding the crime of 
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theft. Nevertheless, any differences between Sunni and Shiite, no matter how minor, will be 
indicated throughout this study. 
The paper is divided into seven sections. A brief overview of shari’a is presented in section 2. 
Section 3 pays special attention to the kinds of punishments that Islam generally endorses, while 
section 4 presents the details and conditions for a crime to be considered a theft under the Islamic 
criminal law. Section 5 examines the general stance of Islamic criminal law from the theory of 
deterrence, a core principle of criminology and rational choice theories. The essence of this study 
is represented in section 6 where deterrence in Islamic criminal law of theft is investigated. We 
divide this section into two parts; the first assumes a fixed probability of detection for all crimes. 
The second part hypothesizes that probability of detection and punishment varies according to 
the crime in question. Finally, section 7 provides concluding remarks and proposals for further 
research. 
 
2. A brief look on Islamic Law (Shari’a) 
The literal meaning of shari’a in Arabic is “the path to the source of water”, the connotation of 
which is that it is the source of life for Muslims (Zakzouk, 2002, p. 89). Shari’a has come to 
mean the “divinely mandated path”, the clear and truthful path that a Muslim must follow in life 
to be submitting to the will of God (Esposito, 1991). As such, shari’a is central to any Islamic 
society. IslamWeb (2002) defines shari’a as “the whole body of beliefs, rituals, transactions, 
policies and norms that Allah has ordered Muslims to abide by”. Supporting this definition, 
Zidan (1969, p. 38) argues that “Shari’a” and “Religion” are synonymous for Muslims. Shari’a 
is based on two essential sources: the qur’an, the holy book of Islam which contains God’s word 
revealed to the prophet Muhammad over a period of 23 years, and the sunna - the practices and 
sayings of Muhammad - which became the source of Islamic ethics and norms for Muslim 
behavior.  
As the Islamic faith attests that both qur’an and sunna were revealed by Allah, the supreme all-
knowing creator, Muslims believe that provisions in both these sacred sources are impeccable 
and infallible, especially provisions that have a specific and fixed meaning. Moreover, Muslims 
also believe that such provisions are universal, suitable for every time and place. The study and 
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interpretation of shari’a through these primary sources is the essence of Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) (Mutahhari, 1983). Fiqh adds to the body of Islamic shari’a laws by integrating different 
secondary sources in case the issue under investigation is not directly mentioned in the texts of 
qur’an and sunna. These secondary sources, also known as juristic principles, are: Ijma, or 
consensus among Islamic scholars, and Qiyas or process of analogical reasoning based on the 
understanding of the principles of the qur’an or sunna.  
As Bälz (2008, p. 122) notes, the difference between divine ordinances, represented by shari’a¸ 
and their worldly interpretation, represented by fiqh, is a vital ingredient of Muslim legal thought 
and has played an important role in the shaping of Islamic law. Even if there is one divine 
provision regarding a certain issue, Muslim scholars tend to disagree on how to implement this 
provision depending on the specific situation in hand. According to Islamic legal doctrine, the 
jurists may choose any opinion to follow when there is no consensus. Shari’a does not sponsor a 
uniform and unequivocal formulation of the law since it bases its discourse on the constant 
interpretations of Muslim scholars of the qur’an and sunna as well as the consensus of the early 
generations of Muslim scholars. Since these scholars interpreted the sources in different ways, 
Muslims usually have various valid opinions for any legal issue in hand. Throughout the history 
of Islamic states, the jurists usually have tended to choose the legal verdict that would suit both 
the ruler’s demands and, more importantly, the circumstances prevailing at the time (Peters, 
2005). 
The institution of the ‘school of jurisprudence’ (madhhab, plural madhahib) united Muslim 
scholars around certain legal doctrines and methodologies. This also brought more coherence 
and consistency in legal thought throughout the Islamic world since the adherents of these 
schools of jurisprudence were bound to follow the methodology of deduction as well as the 
actual opinions of the school’s founding fathers. There are four jurisprudence schools in Sunni 
Muslim: the Hanafi [named after Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man (c. 699–767)], Maliki [named after 
Malik ibn Anas (c. 711–795)], Shafii [named after Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii (c. 767- 820)] 
and Hanbali [named after Ahmad bin Hanbal (c. 780-855)]. Most of the Shi’a Muslims follow 
the Ja’fari jurisprudence [named after Ja’far al-Sadiq (702-765)].  
Controversies on many essential legal issues are persisting between different madhahib and 
sometimes even within the same madhhab. Interestingly, Muslims view such controversies and 
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differences in Islamic legal opinion as permission for the Muslim public to follow any of these 
legal opinions. Furthermore, these differences in Islamic legal opinions stem from the 
uncontested ability of Muslims scholars across different ages to derive new legal opinions that 
suit their contemporary political, social and economic settings. This gives the Islamic legal 
system a dynamic part that can make Islamic laws cope with the changes across time and place. 
Under Islamic jurisprudence this is defined as ijtihad, which means “the making of a decision in 
Islamic law (shari’a) by personal effort, independently of any school of jurisprudence” (Wehr, 
1976). 
Gibb (1953), Zidan (1969, pp. 146-148), Anderson (1976), Al-Shawkani (1990, p. 38), Al-
Ashkar (2005, p. 260) and Al-Milad (2011) emphasize the idea that since the 10
th
 century CE, 
Muslim scholars from the abovementioned madhahib felt that all the fundamental questions of 
fiqh had been carefully studied and entirely finalized. A general consent started to materialize to 
the effect that from that point in time onwards no Muslim legal scholar might be considered to 
have the required qualifications for independent reasoning in law (Mujtahed), and that all related 
future activity would have to be limited to the justification, application, and interpretation of the 
canon as it had been laid down once and for all. This 'closing of the door of ijtihad’ gave rise to 
the concept of taqlid, a term that literally means ‘imitation’, that is; obeying the decision of a 
certain religious authority without essentially examining the scriptural basis or reasoning of that 
specific decision. In other words, accepting the verdict of scholars of fiqh without demanding an 
elucidation of the processes by which they arrive at it, hence observance of one of the classical 
schools of madhahib. 
A considerable body of Islamic law literature refutes the aforesaid claim and argues that the door 
of ijtihad had never closed at any point in time (Hallaq, 1984, p. 33; Bediuzzaman, 1996; 
Kabbani, 2006; Salman, 2007; Al-Qabas, 2011). Rubin (2011, S. 1335) proposes an alternative 
perspective by arguing that the door of ijtihad may have been closed but not locked. In other 
words, political authorities, merchants and other interested parties in Islamic world after the 10
th
 
and 11
th
 centuries may have been able to support efforts leading to ijtihad. Nevertheless, due to 
the incentives supported by the prevailing institutions, few had enough incentive to ‘push the 
door open’. Such observed behavior led to the appearance that the door of ijtihad was closed and 
locked. Nevertheless, nearly all of the above mentioned studies agree that ijtihad should be 
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practiced only by highly qualified Muslim legal scholars to make sure their novel opinions are 
valid enough to be followed by Muslims. It is noticeable, however, that most of the 
contemporary sunni fiqh books base their legal decision only on the four madhhab
3
 and that they 
hardly contain any legal opinion by any Muslim legal scholars after 10
th
 century A.D (Ismail, 
1997; Sabek, 1971).  
 
3. Types of punishments in Islamic criminal law 
According to Zidan (1969, p. 474), Lippman (1989, p. 38), Hosny (2006), and Ramadan (2006b, 
p. 1610), there are three main categories of punishments for offenses in the Islamic penal system. 
The first and most flexible of these punishments is ta’zir. Ta’zir is derived from the verb azzar, 
which literally means, “to discipline with a punishment less than hadd” (Academy of the Arabic 
language, 2004; Omar, 2008). Al-Mursi (1999, p. 189) defines ta’zir as “a disciplinary and 
deterrent penalty on certain individual(s) for a forbidden and inappropriate conduct that cannot 
be punished by hadd, qisas, diya or kaffara (penance). Ta’zir is performed by whichever method 
the ruler (or judge) sees is appropriate and deterrent.” Under the heading of ta’zir, the authorities 
can punish at their discretion all kinds of socially disagreeable behavior from an Islamic point of 
view such as cheating, gambling, or two unmarried individuals of the opposite sex spending time 
in a private place (khulwa) (Bahnasy, 1988, p. 34; Al-Mursi, 1999, p. 191). Ta’zir can even be 
imposed on those who decline to carry out religious duties such as ritual prayer or fasting 
(Peters, 2005, p. 66). The corrective powers of the authorities are hardly restricted and, 
consequently, the doctrine offers little protection to the accused.  
Such punishment setup can induce uncertainty in law enforcement since a rational offender will 
not be able to deduce what the punishment will be for a certain unlawful act. Yet, El-Awa (1983) 
and Al-Khalifi (1992, p. 266) note that the judge is obliged under shari’a to make the 
punishment fit the crime since the qur’an states that “The guerdon of an ill-deed is an ill the like 
thereof. But whosoever pardoneth and amendeth, his wage is the affair of Allah. Lo! He loveth 
not wrong-doers.” (Surah ash-Shura, 42:40) and “If ye punish, then punish with the like of that 
                                                          
3 Al-Maktaba Al-Waqfeya, one of the largest online sources of Islamic books, contains only five fiqh books that are 
not based on the four famous madhahib, see http://www.waqfeya.com/category.php?cid=67 
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wherewith ye were afflicted. But if ye endure patiently, verily it is better for the patient.” (Surah 
an-Nahl, 16:126). Therefore, it is expected that the level of punishment in ta’zir would 
correspond, to a certain extent, to the amount of harm done by the unlawful act. This would 
decrease the level of punishment uncertainty that an offender faces.  
El-Awa (1993, pp. 100-109) categorizes different kinds of ta’zir that were traditionally practiced 
by Muslim jurists against transgressors. These categories of ta’zir punishments include 
admonition, reprimand, threat, boycott, public disclosure, fines and the seizure of property, 
imprisonment, flogging, and death penalty. However, it should be noted that death penalty, 
practiced as a ta’zir punishment, is applied only in cases of high treason, homosexuality, 
propagating heretical or anti-Islamic doctrines, and on habitual offenders who repeatedly commit 
crimes (El-Awa, 1993, p. 109). According to Peters (2005, p. 66), out of the aforementioned 
types of ta’zir, the most common ta’zir punishments through the history of Islam were flogging, 
public rebuke, banishment and imprisonment until repentance. An important point to be taken 
into consideration is that the repentance of the accused prohibits and stops any ta’zir punishment. 
This is not the case of hadd where repentance does not stop the punishment. It is worth noting 
that Islamic jurisprudence does not provide a clear methodology with regards to dealing with 
accused persons that could unfavorably use this rule only to avoid ta’zir. 
The second category of punishment comprises of qisas and diya punishments, which have 
provisions regarding offenses against persons. Qisas, applicable for murder or injury, is based on 
the notion of retaliation and self-administered justice: it involves inflicting the same punishment 
on the defendant as inflicted on the victim, usually by using the same methods (El-Awa, 1993, p. 
71; Al-Mursi, 1999, pp. 141-145; Busaq, 2005, p. 164). Diya, which generally corresponds to 
manslaughter, involves financially compensating an injured or the family of a deceased person in 
case the act of injury or murder was unintentional (corresponding to involuntary manslaughter) 
or semi-intentional (corresponding to voluntary manslaughter) (Busaq, 2005, p. 162; Peters, 
2005, p. 49; Al-Tusi, 2008). Nevertheless, qisas is applied in case the injured or the deceased’s 
family refuse to pardon the offender and do not accept diya as well (El-Awa, 1993, p. 77; Al-
Mursi, 1999; Peters, 2005, p. 44).  
The third and most severe category is the hudud (or hadd, in the singular) punishment laid out in 
the qur’an. The word hudud literally means “limits” or “boundaries” (Kamali, 1998, p. 218). The 
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punishment prescribed for these offenses are seen as “claims of God” (Peters, 2005, p. 54). 
Because they are specified by God, they are regarded as fixed and cannot be changed. They 
include theft (punishable by amputation), armed robbery and banditry (punishable by death, 
amputation of limbs, banishment and crucifixion), extra-marital sex (punishable by death or 
flogging), unfounded accusation of extra-marital sex (punishable by flogging), consumption of 
alcohol (punishable by flogging) and apostasy or renunciation of Islam (punishable by death) 
(Sabek, 1971, p. 302; Al-Mursi, 1999, p. 4; Peters, 2005, p. 53). As with the whole body of fiqh, 
madhahib differ to a certain extent regarding the required provisions for applying prescribed 
punishments for each category of crime. Therefore, our analysis of theft under Islamic criminal 
law will mainly be based on the fiqh opinions with the highest degree of consensus among 
different madhahib. To conclude this section, it is essential to remember that, as the whole body 
of fiqh, most of islamic criminal provisions did not significantly develop after the 10
th
 century 
CE due to the declining of ijtihad efforts and the rise of taqlid through Muslim community. The 
next section will deal extensively with provisions on theft under Islamic criminal law.  
  
4. Theft under Islamic criminal law 
Under Islamic shari’a, theft is considered a hadd crime, where a specific and fixed punishment is 
administered. This punishment is established by qur’an: 
“As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their hands. It is the reward of their own deeds, 
an exemplary punishment from Allah. Allah is Mighty, Wise. But whoso repenteth after his 
wrongdoing and amendeth, lo! Allah will relent toward him. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” 
(Surah al-Mā’ida 5:38-39) 
According to Ali (1955, p. 605) and Al-Mursi (1999, p. 6), cutting the hands was already an 
established punishment for theft in pre-Islamic Arabia. Islam approved such punishment and the 
prophet Muhammad himself administered it through his reign (Sabek, 1971, p. 413). With hudud 
punishments described as ‘brutal and medieval’ (One Law for All, 2010, p. 6) and ‘cruel’ 
(Brems, 2001, p. 217), Muslim jurists and fiqh scholars try to revoke such criticism and provide a 
four-fold rationale behind such punishment for theft crimes; first, cutting the hand of a thief 
makes it very hard for this handicapped offender to commit another theft in the future. Second, 
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the amputation serves as a signal for the society that this individual was a convicted criminal 
and, therefore, interacting with such person must be kept to a minimum (Sedki, 1987, pp. 236-
237; Al-Mursi, 1999, pp. 7-8). Third, by cutting the hand of a thief, this person is believed to 
have made amends for the sin of theft and will not be punished for it in the afterlife (Al-Mursi, 
1999, p. 6). On the contrary, Peters (2005, pp. 53-54) undermines this reason and states that the 
purification from sin is only of secondary importance and does not extend to all cases in which 
fixed penalties are imposed, since these punishments also apply to non-Muslims, who cannot be 
purified from their sins. Lastly and most importantly, there is a consensus among Muslim legal 
scholars that the main reason of applying such punishment is deterrence (Sabek, 1971, p. 411; 
Sedki, 1987, p. 236; Al-Mursi, 1999, p. 6; Peters, 2005, p. 53; Busaq, 2005; Al-Sheha, 2007, p. 
121). As law and economics literature is vastly interested in the concept of deterrence and its 
effect on crime, we attempt to analyze the deterrent effect of Islamic punishment on crimes. 
However, before doing this, a closer look on the conditions needed to apply punishment of theft 
crimes in Islam is required. 
Even though the qur’an establishes the punishment for theft, the holy book of Muslims does not 
provide any provisions regarding how this punishment should be applied. Nevertheless, the main 
schools of fiqh develop an extensive set of requirements where a theft can be considered a hadd 
crime and is therefore punished by amputation of the right hand (or, according to the Shiites, of 
the four fingers of the right hand). These set of rules is derived from three main sources, which 
are the actions and sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad, the understandings of prophet 
companions - the first generation of Muslims in the 7
th
 century CE, and the interpretation of 
Muslim scholars for rationale of the prophet and his companions (Sabek, 1971, pp. 410-426; Al-
Mursi, 1999, pp. 5-23). These provisions for hadd application have two categorizes; those related 
to the thief; and those related to the stolen item. As for the former, the most important provisions 
are that the thief must be sane, adult, have no share in the stolen money, and have no need to 
steal for himself or for another person. For the latter category, the stolen item must have been 
taken, among other requirements, in secret from a secure place and have a certain minimum 
value (nissab) (for a complete list of these provisions, see appendix).  
Related literature argues that the most important of these requirements for hadd application are 
the surreptitious nature of theft, as well as the minimum value of stolen item. As for the former, 
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Ramadan (2006b, p. 1617) states that the ‘taking secretly’ element is important with respect to 
the definition of the offense and the appropriate punishment. As the definition of theft in Islamic 
Fiqh emphasises the secretive nature of stealing, legal decisions by muslim scholars are affected 
by this notion.  
As for the latter, the concept of nissab in theft is established by the act of Prophet Muhammad, 
who amputated the hand of a thief for stealing a shield that was worth three Dirhams (Bukhari, 
1996, Vol VIII, Book 81-No. 788/789/790) and his saying that, “The hand should be cut off for 
stealing something that is worth a quarter of a Dinar or more.” (Bukhari, 1996, Vol VIII, Book 
81- No. 780). At the time of Muhammad, three dirhams were equal to quarter of a Dinar (Sabek, 
1971, p. 420). Al-Masha’al (2007) studies different opinions regarding the minimum value of the 
stolen item and reaches the conclusion that the suitable current value is 1.06 g of gold, which 
approximately equals $45.1 in current US dollars
4
. In case the theft did not meet the conditions 
needed to apply the fixed hadd punishment for amputation of the actor’s hand, then the actor 
may be sentenced to a ta’zir punishment. As aforementioned, ta’zir gives wide-ranging powers 
for the judge or ruler as they punish (1) those who have committed theft but could not be 
convicted on technical grounds (e.g. in cases of uncertainty of evidence (shubha), or when the 
owner of the stolen item pardons the accused) and also (2) those who have committed theft but 
do not fall under their abovementioned strict conditions (Bahnasy, 1988, p. 19; Peters, 2005, p. 
66).  
As can be concluded from this section, punishment of theft under Islamic penal law differs 
significantly from corresponding western legal frameworks and even from contemporary legal 
systems in most Arabic and Islamic countries. Under the framework of public international law, 
such punishments, whether for hadd or ta’zir, are considered cruel and inhuman. Article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” It should be noted that this 
                                                          
4 Gold-US Dollars conversion was calculated on October 31, 2013 using the goldprice.org website, 
http://goldprice.org/Calculators/Gold-Price-Calculators.html 
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study does not project any ethical predisposition or judgments on Islamic criminal law. We also 
do not intend to compare normatively between the “modern-humane” western legal institutions 
and the “archaic-brutal” Islamic laws. In the next section, we will investigate deterrence theory 
in Islamic criminal law. 
 
5. Deterrence in theory of Islamic criminal law 
Most of the literature dealing with punishment in Islamic criminal law argues that the underlying 
principles of all fields of Islamic law are deterrence and retribution. However, deterrence is 
stressed more evidently in most studies (Sabek, 1971; Bahnasy, 1988; El-Awa, 1993; Peters, 
2005). Peters (2005) argues that even though Islamic laws related to homicide are based on 
retribution, the concept of deterrence plays a major role in this case as qur’an states: 
 “And there is life for you in retaliation, O men of understanding that ye may ward off [evil].” 
(Surah Al-Baqara 2:179) 
This is usually understood as signifying that retaliation will deter people from killing. 
Nevertheless, we could not find any Islamic law research dealing with the deterrence incentives 
that this law implies for specific crimes such as theft. Deterrence theory assumes the rationality 
of the criminal. The rational criminal considers the consequence of his behavior before 
committing a crime by calculating the expected benefit from committing the crime and the 
expected cost in case of arrest and punishment and the punishment itself (Becker, 1968). 
Therefore, such a criminal will commit the act if his expected utility from doing so, considering 
his gain and the chance of being caught and sanctioned, exceeds his utility if he does not commit 
the act (Polinsky & Shavell, 2000). In other words, a potential offender commits a crime if his 
private benefits from such crime exceed probability of detection and sanction severity linked to 
this specific crime. 
The law and economics literature dealing with deterrence usually separates between three 
notions of deterrence: general, specific and marginal deterrence. General deterrence focuses on 
reducing the probability of deviance in the general population by threatening all members of 
society with sanctions (LaFave & Scott, 1972; Scaros, 2011, p. 286). Blumstein (1978) defines 
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general deterrence as the inhibiting effect of sanctions on the criminal activity of the public other 
than the sanctioned offender. In other words, when the public perceives that offenders in a 
society receive punishment because of their deviant act, others are assumed to rationally avoid 
crime (Williams & McShane, 1994, p. 19). Specific deterrence shifts the focus from threatening 
all members of society with sanctions to the actual application of punishment onto specific 
offenders. The aim here is to prevent these offenders from future criminal acts by outweighing 
the gain from the crime with a suitably costly sanction (Scaros, 2011, p. 286). In other words, if 
the expected utility of violating law rises with the collective harm generated in a given society, it 
might be optimal for society to install a set of sanctions that increases with the social harm 
associated with that specific violation. With severe sanctions, any criminal would be threatened 
by the negative consequence of crime. Therefore, the expected utility for committing any offense 
would be lower than the expected cost of crime in case there is a sufficient level of detection in 
that society. Craswell (1999, S. 2189) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) argue that the efficient 
deterrence of crime is achieved when the expected sanction regarding a certain crime equals the 
social cost caused by this specific crime. Such concept is called the multiplier principle.  
We find that most of the studies dealing with Islamic law do not clearly differentiate between 
general and specific deterrence. However, it can be seen that the two concepts are relevant in the 
setup of Islamic punishments of crime. A considerable body of Islamic criminal law literature 
argues that had punishment of theft under Islamic law, albeit severe, is an effective deterrent 
since it helps preventing future acts of crime in a given society (see for example (Sabek, 1971; 
El-Awa, 1993; Al-Awabdeh, 2005; Ramadan H. M., 2006a). Ramadan (2006b) clearly states that 
“Islamic law employs a general deterrence approach in its fullest sense by prescribing tough 
punishment for offenses”.  
The third notion of deterrence in law and economics literature, namely marginal deterrence, is 
not considered in studies that dealt with Islamic law so far. The term marginal deterrence in its 
modern sense was introduced by Stigler (1970). However, classical writings on crime and 
punishment have already dealt with marginal deterrence, most noticeably in Beccaria 
(1770/1983) and Montesquieu (1748/1977). Bentham (1789/1973) states that the rationale 
behind punishment is “to induce a man to choose always the less mischievous of two offenses; 
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therefore where two offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offense must 
be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.”  
Shavell (1992) argues that while deterrence theory mostly focuses on situations in which 
individuals consider whether to commit a single harmful act or not, marginal deterrence deals 
with individuals choosing to perform one of several harmful acts. In other words, it is the 
tendency of an individual to be deterred from committing a more harmful act due to the 
difference, or margin, between the expected sanction for such act and a less harmful one. 
Garoupa (2003) states that “as long as expected sanctions rise with harm, criminals will choose 
the commit less harmful criminal acts. The result that the expected sanction for a more harmful 
criminal act should exceed that of a less harmful act is known as the marginal deterrence 
principle.” Friedman and Sjostrom (1993) argue that the logic behind the concept of marginal 
deterrence is demonstrated in the English proverb "As good be hanged for a sheep as a lamb", 
where a thief has the option to carry off one animal from the flock. However, if the penalty is the 
same whichever animal he chooses to steal, he might as well take the most valuable. In the next 
section, we will use the deterrence theory to analyze the Islamic law of theft. 
 
6. Deterrence in Islamic law of theft 
According to Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and Dana (2001), efficient deterrence (or optimal law 
enforcement) is realized when the expected cost for a certain crime is equivalent to the social 
harm caused by this crime or offense. Consequently, the two types of Islamic sanctions for theft 
should correspond to the expected social harm from committing this offense in order to have 
efficient marginal deterrence. However, it is noticeable that the social harm associated with 
committing a ta’zir crime is larger than that associated with the severely punished hadd crime. 
The reason behind such a skewed punishment setup is that the requirements needed to apply 
hadd are directed to prevent first and foremost petty theft rather than crimes of embezzlement, 
fraud or bribery, which can cause greater social harm as the stolen amount in these latter crimes 
may be much larger than that of the former. 
Sabek (1971, p. 412), Al-Mursi (1999, p. 6), and Ramadan (2006b, p. 1617) justify the 
punishment setup for theft by arguing that the harm generated by theft is of a much higher scale 
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than that generated by embezzlement since the social harm of embezzlement is limited to the 
creation of a sphere of mistrust between the victim(s) and the offender, in addition to the value of 
the property stolen. Conversely, social harm resulting from theft extends far beyond the value of 
the stolen property and the trust relationship between the parties as it negatively affects the entire 
sphere of social peace and order. Furthermore, if stealing property by means of secretly taking is 
allowd to be common by imposing a lesser sanction, this would promote an environment of 
guardedness and suspicion which would negatively influence everyday activities and cause 
economic losses (Ramadan H. M., 2006b). On this basis, muslim jurists rationalize that larceny, 
which encompasses secretly taking property that belongs to someone else, deserves a more 
severe punishment than embezzlement. 
A rational offender would only commit theft if the gain from the crime exceeds the probability of 
detection times the cost of the sanction. As literature on Islamic criminal law presents no special 
provisions concerning apprehension of theft, we first assume in our analysis that the expected 
probability of detection in hadd crimes is the same as that of ta’zir, i.e. constant probability of 
detection. Using the latter assumption, subsection 6.1 will analyze, from a marginal deterrence 
perspective, some proposed sanctions under Islamic criminal law. This will be demonstrated by 
some revealing cases. In this part, we will follow Islamic literature and assume that probability 
of detection is the same for all crimes. Nevertheless, It can be reasonably assumed that 
probability of detection vary according to the crime in question. Consequently, the cost of 
committing a crime for a certain offender could be dramatically changed, even with an extreme 
sanction as hand amputation, when the probability of detection is low. We shall deal with the 
assumption of variable probability of detection in subsection 6.2. Even with such assumption, we 
will show how Islamic criminal law of theft is inefficient, ceteris paribus.  
   
6.1. Deterrence with a fixed probability of detection 
From a marginal deterrence perspective, our analysis shows that the structure of Islamic law of 
theft is inefficient since, ceteris paribus, a rational offender choosing between committing a 
crime of petty theft such as pick pocketing, which is punished with right hand amputation, and a 
crime of fraud, bribery or embezzlement, which is punished with ta’zir, would choose the latter 
since it is the crime with lesser punishment and can be of considerable high return. In other 
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words, an offender would be better stealing more (e.g. embezzling money) and, in case of 
apprehension, being punished according to the more lenient rules of ta’zir. To further 
demonstrate this essential point, we present the following cases that better reveal the 
inefficiencies of Islamic criminal law of theft in its current form: 
 
A- Embezzlement  
As abovementioned, embezzlement is punished with ta’zir under Islamic criminal law. This 
provision is mainly based on Prophet Mohammad’s saying “the embezzler, the looter and the 
traitor should not be punished by hadd” (Al-Darmi, 2000, No. 2236). Al-Hamawi (2003, p. 331) 
notes that the definition of embezzlement in Islam differs from that of contemporary law since 
fiqh defines embezzlement as an overt and unlawful acquisition of something in the presence of 
the owner (Al-Sarkhasi, 1978; Ibn Qudama, 1984). This definition does not prescribe whether 
the stolen item is from public or private property. Moreover, the concept of the owner’s presence 
remains blurry through Islamic criminal law as no specific definition is given regarding the 
meaning of “owner’s presence”. However, the crime of treason mentioned above corresponds 
with embezzlement in contemporary legal theory, since treason is defined as unlawfully taking 
from an entrusted property (Al-Bahoti, 1997).  
Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (1968, p. 88) justifies the logic behind this hadith by arguing that one 
cannot take precautions against the thief who breaks into houses and breaches one’s hiding-
places and breaks locks; the owner of the goods cannot do any more than that (i.e., hiding them 
in appropriate places). Therefore, if it was not prescribed for the hand of the thief to be cut off, 
then people would steal from one another and a great deal of harm would be done, and the 
problem of theft would be grave. This is unlike the cases of looting and embezzlement, as the 
looter is the one who overtly steals in the sight of people, making it easy for them to stop this 
criminal act. As for the embezzler, he takes things when the owner is not paying attention. 
Therefore, there has to be some form of negligence, which enables the embezzler to steal, i.e. 
such a crime can be easily avoided. According to Ramadan (2006b, p. 1616), the main 
distinguishable element between theft and larcenous acts, including embezzlement, fraudulent 
larceny, and debtor/pledge refusal to return the pledge/debt, is secretly taking of property. 
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Given such punishment setup for embezzlement, it would be better for a rational offender to steal 
valuable property when the owner is not paying attention and without using force. As one of the 
requirements of a crime to be considered a theft is that the owner of the stolen item must not 
know about the crime, this offender would face an accusation of embezzlement rather than a 
theft and be punished under ta’zir regulations and not hadd. Moreover, the punishment setup 
does not consider value of the stolen item by any chance. In other words, embezzling an 
indefinitely large amount of public or private property will be punished with ta’zir, while an 
offender’s right hand can be amputated for pick pocketing any amount more than or equal to 
$45.1.  
 
B- Stealing public property 
Muslim jurists argue that the main purpose of Islamic criminal law is to protect people and their 
belongings (Sedki, 1987, p. 73). According to Peters (2005, p. 54), the objective of hadd 
penalties is to protect public interest. Hosny (2006, p. 18) notes that Allah did not set any legal 
rule except for the reason of public interest. Protecting public interest would certainly entail 
securing public property against theft by setting an appropriate sanction for the social harm 
corresponding to such offense. However, An-Na’im (1990, p. 5) notes that “Public law has 
traditionally been the least developed aspect of shari’a”. A consensus appears among all 
madhahib (except Maliki) that ta’zir is the appropriate punishment for stealing public property, 
no matter what the value of the stolen property is. The rationale behind this legal rule is that 
hadd is not applied in case the thief had any share in the stolen property. Since public property is 
partially owned by every individual in the society, there is no doubt that the thief partially owns 
the stolen property (Sabek, 1971, p. 415; Al-Mursi, 1999, p. 11; Al-Hamawi, 2003, p. 345; 
Ramadan H. M., 2006b, p. 1630). It is apparent that private property is more protected under 
Islamic shari’a than public property since stealing any private property with a value that exceeds 
nissab is punished with hadd. On the other hand, stealing any amount of public property, no 
matter how large or small the amount, through committing crimes such as tax evasion, bribery or 
unlawful appropriation of development aid, can only be punished with ta’zir. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, a rational offender would rather steal public than private property and face a lesser 
sanction in case of apprehension. 
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C- Stealing perishable foods 
Stealing perishable foods is punished under ta’zir, regardless of the amount of food or its value 
(Al-Mursi, 1999, pp. 15-16; Peters, 2005, p. 56; Ramadan H. M., 2006b, p. 1618). Therefore, 
under such set of punishments, a rational offender would rather steal any amount of food 
products than committing petty theft, ceteris paribus. Ramadan (2006b, p. 1618) presents an 
interesting example that sheds light on how specific the punishment for stealing consumable 
food is in Islam. This example supposes that an offender stole a certain item and swallowed it. In 
this case, Islamic criminal law distinguishes between the case where the stolen property is 
consumable (e.g. food or drink) and the other case where the property is non-consumable (e.g. 
jewelry or money). In the former, the offense committed is criminal damage rather than theft. 
However, in the latter case, Muslim scholars present two propositions: 
 First, swallowing property that is not safely retrieved afterwards is considered 
consumption; therefore, the crime committed is criminal damage.  
 Second, swallowing property that is safely retrieved afterwards is considered “taking 
secretly.” Therefore, the actor is liable for theft if the other requirements of the crime are 
fulfilled and a hadd punishment is applied.  
Therefore, it can be stated that retrieving the property safely after swallowing is the benchmark 
for offense classification. If the property is retrieved safely, the actor has committed theft, 
punished with hadd. If not, then the offense committed is criminal damage, punished by ta’zir. 
 
D- The crime of kidnapping 
Kidnapping and abduction are synonyms in Islamic criminal law. Interestingly, the punishment 
of kidnapping in Islam depends on the status of the victim, whether a slave or a free person
5
 
(Sabek, 1971, p. 417; Ibn Jabrin, 2001; Ouda, 2009). The major Islamic madhahib (except 
Maliki) propose that, in case of the former, hadd is applied on the kidnapper since a slave is 
considered of monetary value and the slave’s owner would be losing a valuable item. However, 
                                                          
5 Although prohibition of slavery is currently an international norm to which most, if not all, states in the world are 
committed, slavery continues to be lawful under Islamic law. For more on this, see An-Na’im (1990). 
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in the latter case, a kidnapper would be punished by ta’zir since a free person is not treated as 
money. In other words, kidnapping a slave is punished more severely than kidnapping a free 
person (Al-Mursi, 1999, p. 11; Al-Marzok, 2005; Al-Washli, 2008, p. 479).  
This sanction setup presents an interesting conundrum demonstrated in the following three 
situations. First, in case an offender threatens a victim with a weapon, then this offender, in case 
of apprehension, will face the highly severe punishment of haraba (one of several sanctions that 
include death, crucifixion, cutting hands and legs, or banishment) (Sabek, 1971, p. 400). Second, 
in case the offender pickpockets a victim, then this offender faces hadd, and his hand is 
amputated. Third, and most interestingly, in case an offender kidnaps a child while using no 
weapon, then this offender receives the least of these punishments and ta’zir is applied. Such an 
inefficient setup of punishments can lead potential offenders to focus more on crimes of 
kidnapping than committing petty theft. It can be assumed that the probability of detection and 
punishment for this crime is independent of the kidnapped person’s status, whether being free or 
slave. It could also be argued that ransom remains the main motive behind kidnapping crimes
6
. 
Consequently, it could be assumed that a free person’s ransom would be greater than of a slave. 
With this in mind, we find that Islamic law incentivizes potential kidnappers to abduct free 
persons rather than slaves, as the former crime offers more gain and lesser sanction than the 
latter. 
 
6.2. Deterrence with a variable probability of detection 
A potential offender would commit a crime when its expected benefit exceeds its expected cost. 
The cost of crime for a potential offender is a product of the probability of detection and the 
severity of sanction (Stigler G. J., 1974). In the previous subsection, we assumed a constant 
probability of detection for all crimes. Therefore, our analysis mainly focused on the marginal 
deterrence of Islamic criminal law corresponding to changes in sanction severity. Through this 
subsection, we will integrate probability of detection in our analysis, assuming its variance 
according to the type of crime in question. Probability of detection plays a major role in Becker’s 
(1968) rational criminal model. Stigler (1974, S. 60) states that the sanction and probability of 
                                                          
6 Apps (2011) states that, the insurance sector worldwide began writing ‘Kidnap & Ransom’ policies in the late 
1970s. Such insurance policies currently generate yearly premiums of nearly $500 million.  
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detection must be increasing functions of the enormity of the offense. From this perspective, it 
can be argued that integrating probability of detection in our analysis could alter the findings of 
subsection 6.1. In other words, it may be the case that the probability of detection of hadd crimes 
is low and that of ta’zir crimes is high. Thus, even if the latter crimes are more lucrative, it is 
possible to preserve marginal deterrence while punishing them less severely.  
We argue that, even when taking probability of detection into consideration, Islamic criminal law 
incentivizes potential offenders to commit more harmful criminal acts. According to Forte (1985, 
S. 53), Islamic law of theft is based on the idea of manifest criminality. The concept of manifest 
criminality is "that the commission of the crime be objectively discernible at the time that it 
occurred." (Fletcher, 2000, S. 116). In other words, manifest criminality describes certain crimes 
where the prohibited act could be recognized as a crime by a neutral third party observer without 
special knowledge of the offender’s intention (Steel, 2008). In the context of Islamic criminal 
law, theft is considered a manifest crime while embezzlement, for example, is considered a non-
manifest crime. According to Garoupa and Gomez (2008), the probability of detection is higher 
in the case of manifest theft than in the case of non-manifest theft for the same level of resources 
invested in apprehension and punishment. Additionally, as the sanction for manifest theft in 
Islam is more severe than non-manifest embezzlement, this violates the multiplier principle and 
becomes inefficient
7
.  
This remark is supported by the models developed through economic literature of avoidance 
activities (Malik, 1990; Nussim & Tabbach, 2007) and self-reporting (Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; 
Innes, 2001). From their perspective, manifest crime is less costly for the society. This is because 
it is easier to detect and prosecute such crimes without wasting valuable resources. On the other 
hand, an offender committing non-manifest crime exerts valuable resources to hide the unlawful 
activity. Consequently, non-manifest crime has a higher social cost than manifest crime. 
According to Garoupa and Gomez (2008), there are two reasons why penalties should be 
designed to induce higher incentives for manifest rather than for non-manifest crimes, due to the 
high social cost of the latter. First, manifest crimes have lower investigation and prosecution 
                                                          
7 The setup of Islamic criminal law resembles to a great extent that of Roman law. Consequently, this line of 
economic analysis is similar to that offered by Garoupa and Gomez (2008).  
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costs for victims. Second, manifest crimes generate fewer criminal avoidance activities that are a 
waste of resources, which have a positive effect on the cost of detection and punishment. 
Since manifest crimes have less social cost than non-manifest crimes, the sanction associated 
with the former should be lower than that of the latter. In other words, the setup of Islamic 
criminal law should incentivize potential offenders to commit a manifest crime such as theft, as it 
is less costly and easier to detect. Nevertheless, Islamic criminal law offers hadd sanction for 
manifest crime and ta’zir for non-manifest crime. Such setup violates the multiplier principle as 
well as the marginal deterrence concept.  
Consider a simple case where a potential offender rationalizes whether to commit theft or 
embezzlement. The expected utility from theft for this offender is  
  
     
                                                                               
  
Where bt is the offender’s benefit from theft, dt is the probability of detecting theft. st is the 
sanction of theft. Similarly, the expected utility from embezzlement is  
 e
de.se
                                                                             
Where be is the offender’s benefit from embezzlement, de is the probability of detecting 
embezzlement. se is the sanction of embezzlement in Islamic criminal law. We know that the 
sanction for theft (hadd) is more severe than that of embezzlement (ta’zir), consequently: 
                                                        st>se                                                                            (3) 
As for the probability of detection, theft, as a manifest crime, has a higher probability of 
detection than embezzlement, a non-manifest crime: 
                                                      dt>de                                                                             (4) 
Therefore, the expected cost of theft is always higher than the expected cost of embezzlement: 
                                                               dt.st>de.se                                                                      (5) 
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Assuming bt=be, from a marginal deterrence perspective, a potential offender would prefer to 
commit embezzlement than theft,  
                                                
  
     
 < 
 e
de.se
 
As for the multiplier principle, equation (5) demonstrates that the expected sanction of theft is 
higher than that of embezzlement. Since manifest theft has less social harm than that of non-
manifest embezzlement, multiplier principle is not fulfilled through the setup of Islamic criminal 
law.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The novelty of this study stems from analyzing Islamic criminal laws through theories developed 
by the field of ‘law and economics’. Being revered by approximately one fifth of the world’s 
population, these laws obtain their significance from Muslim’s resolute belief in their divine 
nature. Additionally, with the historical upsurge of Islamic movements in Arab spring countries 
and calls for full application of shari’a through their respective societies, it becomes apparent 
that attempts to apply Islamic criminal law may soon materialize. Interestingly, no studies have 
been conducted by Islamic movements or interested parties to forecast the expected impact of 
applying these criminal laws, which may radically alter the legal and penological setup of the 
respective countries. Furthermore, research aiming to analyze law from an economic viewpoint 
has not tackle Islamic laws so far. Thus, this study is a first step towards bringing the attention of 
economists and legal researchers towards Islamic law at this crucial time of political and legal 
developments in Arab spring countries. 
using the concept of marginal deterrence, as well as the multiplier principle, on Islamic penal 
laws of theft, the study has demonstrated that a rational offender would chose to steal an item 
that does not correspond with the conditions specified for the severe punishment of hadd and 
would chose, given the same return, a crime that would face the less severe punishment, which in 
our case is ta’zir. Legal rationale would set law so that the severity of the punishment is 
positively correlated with the seriousness of the crime in hand. The current setup of Islamic 
criminal law of theft contains major inefficiencies as crimes with severe social harm have 
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relatively lenient punishments while less serious crimes and petty theft have an extreme 
punishment of hand amputation. Consequently, criminals would prefer to commit crimes with 
high levels of social harm, and economic cost of crime for society would significantly rise. The 
reason behind such an inefficient legal setup is that crucial economic and legal concepts were not 
fully developed or taken into consideration by founders of madhahib in the 8th and 9th century 
CE. Even at our present time, contemporary Muslim jurists still base their legal verdicts on those 
madhahib, indefinitely prolonging the archaic viewpoints of madhahib founders. We call for a 
modern Islamic reinterpretation and recoding of Islamic penal laws as it offers little help in 
deterring crime, especially serious crime, in its current status-quo. 
However, it is still not clear whether reason and logic motivate Muslim jurists to restructure 
Islamic laws of theft to correspond with sound legal and penological policies or if their belief in 
the infallibility of the current form of Islamic law deter them from extrapolating new legal 
verdicts. According to An-Na’im (1990, p. 112), searching for rational justification may help the 
believer to understand the wisdom and rationale of the Shari’a, but failure to find sufficient 
objective justification does not relieve him or her of the duty to comply. Consequently, 
penological and sociological considerations cannot affect the principle of hudud. In other words, 
the existence of hudud as part of the criminal law of an Islamic state is not dependant on the 
existence or strength of penological or sociological justifications. Nevertheless, we hope that, 
with the eminent potential of applying shari’a in Arab spring countries, Muslim jurists find 
enough motivation to review legal verdicts of Islamic criminal law in order to achieve efficient 
marginal deterrence. Our study demonstrates that, in its current form, an efficient deterrence is 
not provided through Islamic criminal law of theft due to its skewed and inefficient setup of 
punishments for criminal acts.  
Further research on Islamic criminal law is needed at this point in time. Most importantly, since 
Islamic law was implemented with varying degrees across different societies through fifteen 
centuries of Islamic history, empirical studies are indispensable to investigate the effects of 
applying shari’a in Arabic Spring countries on their crime rates and deterrence. Moreover, since 
law and economics literature has developed advanced models in their quest to determine the 
optimal levels of law enforcement and deterrence in various settings, in-depth theoretical 
investigation of the stance of Islamic criminal law regarding different crimes is needed as well.
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Appendix 
Requirements of applying hadd punishment for theft crimes in shari’a and fiqh* 
Regarding the Actor: 
1. The offender must be sane and adult (more than 15 years old according to most 
madhaheb). 
2. The offender must not have resorted to stealing under compulsion. If that person had 
been obliged to do so because of hunger or poverty, the penal code is not applied. 
3. If the actor claims that, when taking the item in question, the intention of stealing did not 
exist and the judge considers this, then the hand amputation penalty is not applied. 
4. If before a theft can be proved, the offender goes to the judge and repents and promises 
not to steal in future, this person is saved from the punishment. However, once the theft 
has been proved, repentance is of no consequence and punishment will be implemented. 
5. The offender must take away the stolen item from its proper place. If one takes out the 
thing from its owner’s designated safe place and another actor steals it away, neither of 
the two can be punished for theft. Because, the one who has taken out the thing from its 
safe place has not stolen it and the one who has stolen it has not done so from its place of 
safety. 
6. If the owner takes back his goods or allows the offender to keep them before the matter is 
reported to the judge and does not press for a penalty. 
7. If the offender steals a certain good in the presence of its owner, the hadd punishment is 
not applied as theft is defined under Islamic penal law as “taking something without the 
knowledge of its owner”. In such case, the actor is beaten up and warned about repeating 
this act again. However if a weapon was used in the theft, the punishment is equal to that 
of being at war against the Muslim society and is punished by haraba, a severe set of 
                                                          
* Sources: Kamal-Al-Din A. Al-Mursi, Al-hudud al-shariya fe al-deen al-islami (The legal hudud in Islam). (Dar Al-
Ma'refa Al-Jame’iya, 1999). Elsayed Sabek. Fiqh alsunna (The jurisprudence of sunna). (Dar Al-Fikr for printing, 
publishing and distribution., 1971). Rudolph Peters. Crime and punishment in Islamic law: theory and practice from 
the sixteenth to the Twenty-first century. (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Mohamed B. Ismail. Al-fiqh al-
wadeh (The clear fiqh). (Dar Al-Manar, 1997). Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic law: a comparative 
study. (American Trust Publications, 1993). 
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punishments which include crucifixion, cross amputation of the thief’s right hand and left 
foot, banishment and death. 
8. In order to prove the theft, two just Muslim witnesses should have seen the actor stealing. 
It may also be the case where there is only one witness but the owner of the stolen item 
also testifies that the specific actor has been seen stealing.  
 
Regarding the stolen item: 
9. The item stolen must have been taken from a secure place. If something is not kept in a 
safe place and left unsecured, its theft does not incur punishment.  
10. The stolen item must be moveable. Stealing a building or a land property is not punished 
by hudud.  
11. The stolen item has to have a certain minimum value (nissab).  
12. The stolen item must be taken away in a surreptitious way. If someone steals goods from 
a market booth in broad daylight, the fixed penalty for theft cannot be imposed because 
the goods were not secretly stolen. 
13. The stolen item must not be partially owned by the actor. Since Islam stresses on the 
notion that the children owe their lives and their belongings to their parents, if a father 
steals from his son, he is not punished. On the contrary if a son or a daughter steals from 
the father or mother their hands are amputated.  
14. Stealing public utility or state treasury does not entail the fixed punishment of hadd, as it 
is considered to be partially owned by the actor. The value of the stolen public utility or 
the amount stolen out of the state treasury is not taken into consideration. 
15. The stolen item must not be entrusted to the actor. Therefore, there is no hadd 
punishment for embezzlement, i.e. the misappropriation of goods entrusted to the 
embezzler. 
16. If the use of the stolen things is considered forbidden, there is no hadd punishment 
against the robber. Forbidden items include wine, pork, pornographic material, 
copyrighted art that exposes private parts of men and women, musical instruments and 
cigarettes among others. 
17. Perishable foodstuffs cannot entail the fixed punishment. 
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Religious Loyalty and Acceptance of Corruption 
 
Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationship between religiously-induced internalized values of 
individuals and their specific attitudes regarding the acceptance of corruption. The dataset 
on which our study is based was collected by the World Values Survey from 164,209 
individuals in 80 countries surveyed during a period of 18 years. We propose that 
individual attitudes towards corruption and religion are associated given certain societal 
and institutional contexts. Our results show that although there is a negative and 
statistically significant effect of religiosity on the acceptance of corruption on the 
individual level, this effect is small. We find that there is a threshold value of religiosity 
below which corruption is more easily accepted by individuals. Our interpretation for this 
result is simple: individuals with minimal religiosity are generally less constrained by 
religious norms; specifically, religious norms that are opposed to corruption are less 
binding on these individuals, resulting in them having a greater propensity to accept 
corruption. Religiosity, therefore, does lower the acceptance of corruption only when it 
exceeds a certain threshold for a specific individual.  
 
Keywords: Religion, Corruption, Institutions, Preferences  
 
JEL Classification: A1, D0, D1, D7, K4, Z1 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of corruption has no universally accepted definition (Bhattarai, 2009). Nevertheless, 
international organizations have reached a de facto consensus about the grave negative effects of 
corruption on both global and local levels. The World Bank classifies corruption as “the single 
greatest obstacle to economic and social development” (Duasa, 2008, p. 2), while Transparency 
international identifies corruption in its mission statement as “one of the greatest challenges of 
the contemporary world. It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, 
leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private sector development 
and particularly hurts the poor” (Transparency International, 2011). In a world economy that was 
worth USD 30 trillion in 2001-2002, The World Bank estimates that about USD 1 trillion are 
paid out in bribes each year, globally (World Bank, 2004). Transparency International, in its 
annual report on global corruption, calculated in 2004 that, worldwide, public procurement lost 
at least USD 400 billion per year due to bribery (Transparency International, 2006).  
This study investigates the relationship between religiously-induced internalized values of 
individuals and their specific attitudes regarding the acceptance of corruption. Based on the 
principles of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), we propose that individual attitudes toward 
corruption and religion are associated with certain given societal and institutional contexts. We 
use data collected by the World Values Survey (WVS) from 164,209 individuals in 80 countries 
surveyed in 18 different years.  
 
Our results show that, although there is a negative and statistically significant effect of religiosity 
on the acceptance of corruption by individuals, the effect is small. Interestingly, we find that 
those people who have a value of religiosity below a certain threshold have a greater acceptance 
of corruption. Our interpretation for this result is simple: individuals with minimal religiosity are 
generally less restricted by religious norms, including those norms that are opposed to 
corruption, resulting in them having a greater propensity to accept corruption. Religiosity does 
lower the acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds the threshold for a specific individual. 
We find that religiosity’s effect on the acceptance of corruption does not systematically differ 
among individuals of different religious denominations. In addition, our results show that the 
more accepted corruption is at the societal level, the less of a mitigating effect religiosity has on 
the individual’s acceptance of corruption.   
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This study is divided into six sections. The next section provides a multi-disciplinary literature 
review on religiosity and corruption while section three presents the theoretical basis for this 
study as well as our hypotheses. This is followed by a description of our methodology in section 
four, the empirical results in section five and conclusions in section six.  
 
2. Literature Review 
There are two previous studies that analyze individual attitudes toward corruption and religiosity. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) (hereafter GSZ) investigate the effect of religion on 
people’s economic attitudes, while controlling for country-fixed effects. GSZ use data collected 
by the World Values Survey (WVS) in three surveys (1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997) 
which covered 66 countries. GSZ employ three distinct measures of religiosity simultaneously in 
each estimation: 
• “Raised religiously”; the answer takes on a value of 1 when the respondent answered 
positively to the question “Were you brought up religiously at home?’’  
• “Currently religious”; the answer takes on a value of 1 when the respondent affirms  
having attended religious services (apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at 
least once a year.   
• “Actively religious”; the answer takes on a value of 1 when the respondent affirms  
having attended religious services (apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at 
least once a week.   
As for the dependent variables, GSZ categorize economic attitudes into six categories; attitudes 
toward cooperation, women, government, thriftiness, the market economy and its fairness, and 
legal rules. GSZ base their measurements of the latter category on the answer to a specific 
question asking if the respondents think that certain illegal acts are justifiable using a scale 
between 1 (never justifiable) and 10 (always justifiable). The illegal acts in question are; 
claiming government benefits to which the respondent is not entitled, avoiding paying the fare on 
public transport, tax frauds, buying stolen goods and accepting bribes. OLS regression results 
measuring the effect of religiosity on acceptance of bribery, mostly find negative effects, 
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regardless of whether they include all religious denominations or estimate separately for each 
denomination. However, as some of these estimated effects are not statistically significant, GSZ 
conclude that no inference is possible concerning which religion might be better in terms of the 
economic outcomes.  
The second study that we build upon is that of Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini (2003) (GPR 
hereafter). While the study of GSZ is broader than ours with respect to the variables, GPR’s 
study investigates a wider range of social effects of attitudes toward corruption. GPR also use 
data from the WVS, although with a much smaller sample size than that used by GSZ and us, 
because their analysis mainly focuses on the WVS’ third survey. Effects of religiosity are 
captured by including denomination dummies and a dummy for regular church attendance. GPR 
find that regular church attendance is negatively associated with acceptance of corruption. They 
also find that Catholic/Jewish respondents are characterized by a higher/lower acceptance of 
corruption.  
 
Our study differs from those of GSZ and GPR on several levels. (1) We focus on the relationship 
between attitudes toward corruption and religiosity from an NIE perspective; (2) we use a larger 
sample, as we are able to include the latest wave of WVS survey responses; (3) we use a 
synthetic religiosity index instead of three dummy indicators or just a dummy for church 
attendance; (4) we treat attitudes toward corruption as a binary indicator, due to a very skewed 
distribution.   
Attempts to build a theoretical model to analyze corruption’s causes and consequences are 
numerous (Nas, Price, & Weber, 1986; Caiden, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mishra, 2006; 
Khan, 2006; Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Matei & Matei, 2009). These studies are not 
only based on economic perspectives but also on other specialist fields, including finance, public 
administration, sociology and political science. However, economists were generally interested 
in specifically modeling the relation between corruption and economic development (Macrae, 
1982; Ehrlich & Lui, 1999; Barreto R. A., 2000; Mauro, 2002; Barreto & Alm, 2003; Basu, 
2006). As for the empirical research, a growing number of studies investigate the causes and 
effects of corruption across countries (Mauro, 1995; Ades A. D., 1997; Van Rijckeghem & 
Weder, 1997; Wei, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Lambsdorff, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Jain, 2001; 
Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003). These studies have searched for empirical correlations between 
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corruption and a variety of economic and non-economic determinants. However, there is still no 
commonly accepted theory on which to base an empirical model of the causes of corruption (Alt 
& Lassen, 2003). 
Corruption was only recently incorporated in the studies of sociologists through their 
examination of social deviance (Naumova, 2009). Marquette (2010) asserts that the influence of 
religion on attitudes towards corruption is not clear, as many other factors come into the 
formation of these attitudes such as gender, age, education level and the nature of religion and 
the religious community involved. This claim is supported by the study of Hirschi and Stark 
(1969) who investigate the relation between church attendance and delinquent attitudes and 
behavior. They find that attendance at church influences neither actual delinquent acts nor 
attitudes towards delinquency, even amongst respondents who believe in a literal hell and the 
devil.   
The results of the latter study contradict those of Tittle and Welch (1983) wherein the 
demographics and the religious affiliations of residents of several US states are surveyed. The 
authors find that there is little or no difference between religious and non-religious respondents 
regarding behavior that is condemned by society as a whole, such as major theft, assault and tax 
evasion. However, significant differences are found when it comes to behavior that is not widely 
condemned by society, such as pot smoking and not standing for the national anthem. This 
implies that the deterrent impact of religion on attitudes concerning corrupt behavior positively 
correlates with the intensity of social condemnation of such behavior.   
Beets (2007) gives two main arguments as to why religiosity might encourage people to resist 
corruption: (1) the ill-treatment of others, theft and dishonesty are not compatible with adherence 
to a religion; (2) religion provides moral guidance to its adherents. These two arguments are 
supported by Treisman (2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003), Braun 
and Di Tella (2004), Kunicova and Rose Ackerman (2005), and Lederman, Loayza, & Soares 
(2005). North, Orman and Gwin (2013) argue that a religious society is expected to demonstrate 
a higher degree of morality than a non-religious one. Therefore, it is assumed that in countries 
where religion plays an essential role in the lives of most people, civic employees, as well as 
others, are likely to obtain their ethical framework at least partly from their religion: this, in turn, 
will directly influence their tendency to commit corrupt acts. Religion is said to provide its 
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followers with a code of ethics, some of which are of significant importance in the battle against 
corruption. However, as Marquette (2010) argues, there is a logical error in this argument 
because it presupposes that all religions emphasize the same moral codes. In actuality, a 
considerable body of literature proposes that followers of different religions – or even sects of a 
religion – hold divergent opinions on what constitutes morality (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 
2003; Al-Marhubi, 2004; Durkheim, 1912/1915; Weber, 2010; Jagodzinski, 2009). Luxmoore 
(1999) attempts to rebut this claim by assuming that because certain values such as fairness and 
honesty are basic teachings of most - if not all - religions, these same religions can therefore be 
used as an antidote for corruption. In Table 4, we document how some of the main sources of the 
major world religions stress the immorality of theft and bribery. 
Contradicting the assumption by Luxmoore (1999), Marquette (2010) “many of the most corrupt 
countries in the world (according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index) 
also rank high in terms of religiosity (using indicators such as those used by the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project)”. This apparent contradiction has two main explanations. First, in countries 
where a high level of both religiosity and corruption exists, other endogenous factors may be 
affecting them both: for example, the presence of a corrupt theocratic leadership in a certain 
country. Investigating such endogenous factors is beyond the scope of most literature focused on 
the religion-corruption nexus. However, some control variables relating to the political and social 
environment in sampled countries are taken into consideration. Second, the level of religiosity 
might not be the only important explanation when investigating its relation to the perceived 
corruption levels and the type of religion. For that reason, various studies use the type of religion 
as an explanatory variable and show that it has a significant effect on the level of corruption in 
the sampled countries (La Porta, De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 
2001; Beets, 2007; Mutascu, 2010). However, other studies find an insignificant relation between 
the public level of adherence to a certain religion in a country and the country’s perceived level 
of corruption (North, Orman, & Gwin, 2013; Flavin & Ledet, 2008).  
Several economic literature studies investigate the relation between religion and corruption (La 
Porta, De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; Chang & Golden, 
2007). Treisman (2000) shows that religion reduces corruption since it helps civil society to be 
more organized and ensures that citizens are more likely to monitor elite groups. Paldam (2001) 
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argues that religion may limit the effects of corruption and notes, for example, that the 
percentage of Protestants in a country is reciprocally related to corruption level. According to 
Flavin and Ledet (2008), scholars debate the appropriate measurement of religiosity, and explain 
that this is partly due to “…disagreements… about how best to quantify religion and an 
individual’s underlying “level” of religious belief and devotion when referring to the different 
ways in which religiosity can be assessed”. Religion was assessed through examining the 
“dominant religion” or “the religion of majority” in a certain country. However, most of these 
studies are flawed because they assume that, if an individual ascribes to a certain religion, their 
behavior is bound by the rules of that religion. The level of adherence to a religion is not 
investigated in these studies and that might significantly impact the overall conclusion.   
We can deduce from the foregoing, that, although theoretical arguments supporting the negative 
relation between religion and corruption may seem valid and logical, the results of the 
considerable body of empirical literature addressing this issue remain controversial and 
inconclusive. Marquette (2010) states “that the evidence for a causal relationship between 
religion (or types of religion) and either higher or lower levels of corruption is in no way 
convincing”. The author argues that the data - on religion - used in the majority of these studies 
are aggregated at the country level. Therefore, such studies are ill-equipped to examine aspects 
such as: (1) the influence of religion on how attitudes are formed, (2) how individual attitudes 
towards corruption are formed and (3) what are the possible strategies that the religion(s) permits 
or encourages its adherents to follow in order to change corrupt behavior. In order to avoid these 
shortcomings, this study will be based on a dataset collected by the World Values Survey.   
Regarding aspect (1), we hypothesize that religion forms an essential component of the 
individual’s morality in social groups with high rates of religiosity. As for aspect (2), we 
hypothesize that religions, in general, endorse honesty and suppress corruption. Therefore, as the 
degree of religiosity increases on the individual level, their general attitudes towards corruption 
conform more and more with the religion’s fundamental morality teachings. It is difficult to fully 
assess the specific approach of every religion towards corruption. Therefore, we test the effect of 
religiosity on corruption by either first, considering the type of religion or second, disregarding 
the religious type under investigation. This allows us to assess whether religiosity generically 
affects corruption or, adherence to a certain religion is the main influence on the level of 
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corruption in any given country. Concerning aspect (3), it is essential to point out that actions 
endorsed by a certain religion against corruption are not practiced in a vacuum. In other words, 
social institutions  (at both group and country level), can play a major role in influencing 
individual attitudes towards corruption by offering various positive attitudes and appropriate 
actions against corruption (e.g. whistle-blowing) and limiting or suppressing other unwanted 
attitudes and actions (e.g., citizens’ vigilante behavior against corrupt officials).   
Following the tradition of the New Institutional Economics (North D. C., 1990), we argue that 
individual attitudes about corruption are affected not only by the legal system, i.e., formal 
institutions, but also by the prevailing morals and values in a society, i.e., informal institutions. 
Consequently, individuals who are constantly exposed to a certain religion will – to a significant 
extent – adopt its prescribed system of beliefs and values (i.e., informal rules) which frame their 
own constraints when tempted by corruption.  
 
3. Theoretical Background  
Stark and Bainbridge (1985, S. 5) and Iannaccone (1998, S. 1466) define religion as any shared 
set of beliefs, activities, and institutions based upon faith in supernatural forces. All religious 
sects investigated through this study emphasize the immorality of theft and bribery in their 
theological teachings. Table 4 provides a modest survey of religious texts that deal with stealing 
and bribery: these texts represent the foundations of these religions. A more comprehensive 
survey is beyond the scope of this study.  
The effect of religiosity on attitudes towards corruption remains an issue for debate in the 
empirical literature of sociology and economics. There is a schism between theology and social 
sciences on the stance of different religions regarding stealing and bribery. Several theories are 
proposed to explain the source of this confusion
1
. We now summarize the main points of these 
theories. 
                                                          
1 Marquette (2010) provides an excellent overview of these theories. 
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Middleton and Putney (1962) conclude that some uncertainty is created by confusion of the 
scope of empirical research related to religion and morality. They emphasize that there is 
commonly a failure to distinguish between two different kinds of ethical standards: the ascetic 
(i.e., sexual inclinations, gambling) and the social (i.e., cheating, theft). Violations of social 
standards are harmful to every member of society, both religious and nonreligious people. 
However, since violations of ascetic standards are usually not directly harmful to society as a 
whole, the nonreligious are expected to be more prescribed by these standards than the religious. 
Accordingly, differences in behavior between the religious and the nonreligious are apparent in 
specific areas only, and are a product of divergence in standards rather than to a differential 
upholding of standards.   
Tittle and Welch (1983) argue that individual religiosity has a significant impact on suppressing 
deviant behavior in highly secularized and run-down communities. In contrast, it is less of a 
deterrent in highly integrated and organized communities where religious morality is redundant 
given the other sources of moral authority and social control. Van Vleet, Cockayne and Fowles 
(1999, S. 12) state that most of the research investigating the relation between religion and 
delinquency hinges on a theory of “religious ecology”. This theory proposes that religion is 
negatively associated with deviant behavior only when it is a part of widely accepted social 
values and norms that prohibit such behavior (Chadwick & Top, 1993). Stark, Kant, and Doyle 
(1982, S. 4) observe that “...conflicting findings stem from variations in the religious ecology of 
the communities studied. In communities where religious commitment is the norm, the more 
religious an individual, the less likely he or she will be delinquent. However, in highly 
secularized communities, even the most devout teenagers are no less delinquent than the most 
irreligious.” 
Kohlberg (1981) presents a different perspective, claiming that religiosity and moral reasoning 
are essentially separate areas of human concern. Although moral decision-making is mainly 
influenced by the level of cognitive development (based on, e.g., education) and exposure to the 
socio-moral climate, religious reasoning is based upon teachings by religious authorities that 
emphasize morality. In other words, moral reasoning provides moral prescriptions and religious 
reasoning affirms these moral judgments as meaningful. This conclusion is also apparent in 
Kohlberg’s (1984) theory on stages of moral development, where the author argues that moral 
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reasoning has six identifiable developmental stages. Each of these stages is more suitable for 
responding to moral dilemmas than its predecessor. Kohlberg (1984) states that the process of 
moral development is chiefly concerned with justice, and that it continues throughout the 
individual's lifetime, a notion that spawned dialogue on the philosophical implications of such 
research. As for religion and morality, Power and Kohlberg (1981) suggest that a seventh stage 
should be integrated into the theory under the title “transcendental morality” or “morality of 
cosmic orientation” which links religion with moral reasoning. However, Kohlberg's difficulties 
in obtaining empirical evidence for even the sixth stage, lead him to underline the speculative 
nature of this proposed seventh stage (Power & Kohlberg, 1981). 
Figure 1: The effect of religion on beliefs, values and actions related to corruption 
 
Source: Jagodzinski (2009), modified by the authors. 
The present study  focuses on investigating the specific link between the religiously-induced 
internalized values and beliefs of individuals on the one hand and their specific attitudes 
regarding corruption on the other (represented by the red rectangle in Figure 1), which gives us 
our main hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1: Higher individual-level religiosity is associated with lower acceptance of 
corruption. 
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We focus our analysis specifically on the micro-level rather than the macro-level. An 
individual’s degree of exposure to religion is thought to be reflected by their internalized values 
and beliefs and is measured through variables that demonstrate their level of religious adherence. 
The attitudes and beliefs concerning corruption are reflected through the survey respondents’ 
acceptance of corrupt actions. Because our framework explicitly accounts for the micro-macro 
interaction in values and beliefs, i.e., the social context, we also propose the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Stronger acceptance of corruption at the societal level is associated with higher 
individual-level acceptance of corruption. 
 
4. Methodology and model specification 
Because our hypotheses relate to individual level behavior, it is appropriate that we test them 
with data from individuals. Naturally, experimental data about such behavior is difficult to 
generate or find
2
, therefore, we use survey data taken from the World Values Survey (WVS), 
which measures values and attitudes in representative samples from more than 80 countries 
around the world. Index i denotes individuals surveyed, j denotes country of residence and t 
denotes year of survey. Our estimation sample is composed of 164,209 individuals in 80 
countries surveyed in 18 different years.  
Following a considerable body of literature
3
,  the degree of acceptance of corruption is measured 
by responses to the WVS question “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether 
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or it’s somewhere in between, that 
someone accepts a bribe in the course of their duties.” The responses range from 1 (never 
justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable).   
                                                          
2
 Armantier and Boly (2011) provide evidence from a controlled field experiment that religiosity, measured through 
a post-experimental question of how often the subject goes to church, is associated with a lower probability of 
subjects accepting bribes.  
3
 See, for example, Swamy et al., (2001), Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini (2003), You and Khagram (2005) and 
Esarey and Chirillo (2012)  
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Because the responses to this question are very skewed towards 1 (almost 75%), we recode this 
information into a binary format. Our dependent variable Corruptioni   takes on a value of 0 if 
respondents answered that bribes are never justified, and a value of 1 otherwise. Intuitively, this 
procedure is in line with the observation that religious norms usually do not permit any 
intermediate level of corruption.   
The main variable of interest, religiosity, is measured through responses to four WVS questions: 
(1) “Indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion?” (2) “Apart from 
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days”, (3) “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious 
person?”, and (4) “How important is God in your life?” We construct a weighted index 
Religiosityi from these questions, weighted according to the results from a factor analysis. In 
order to control for denominational differences, we also include dummies for the 7 main 
denominations with which the respondent might be affiliated.  
In order to capture the micro-macro interaction of the theoretical framework (hypothesis 2), we 
include as independent variables the aggregated country-level mean for corruptibility 
(Acceptancejt).  
We estimate  
    
1 2
0 1 2Pr 1|i i i jt iCorruption X G Reli Z Zgiosity u        (1) 
with maximum likelihood, where G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
1
iZ  
is the vector containing our individual level controls and 2
jtZ  is the vector containing our 
country-level controls.  
Several individual-level control variables are included in Zi
1
. We control for sex (Malei), age 
(Agei), education (Educationi), marital status (Marriedi), employment status (Unemployedi) and 
trust towards others (Trusti) of the respondent. To control for income-related differences, we 
include an ordinal variable (Incomei) which is a subjective, self-reported assessment of the 
respondent’s income level. We also control for the respondent’s financial satisfaction 
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(Financial_satisfactioni), because low financial satisfaction might be associated with higher 
acceptance of corruption.   
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to variables which cannot be accounted for, such as, the 
respondents’ acceptance of corruption and religiosity may be affected by the year that the survey 
was carried out in or the country or region that they live in. There are, accordingly, two distinct 
approaches to arrange the vector Z
2
jt . The first approach is to include a full set of country and 
year dummies that accounts for any level differences there might be between countries in 
different years. The second approach is to include a wide set of time-varying country-level 
variables which might be relevant in influencing acceptance of corruption on a macro-level. A 
country’s colonial history might influence its formal and informal institutions, which is why we 
control for it with a set of appropriate dummies (Colonial_historyXj)
4
. More institutional 
variables include an indicator for quality of democracy (Democracyj) and age of democracy 
(Age_democracyjt). We also control for per capita income (GDPjt)
5
. The two approaches for 
arranging the vector 
2
jtZ  
are mutually exclusive as combining country, region and year dummies 
with multiple country level variables would result in near perfect multicollinearity. Details on all 
variables can be found in Table 1 and 2. 
5. Estimation results 
In Probit estimations, the marginal effect of any explanatory variable is (1) inherently non-linear 
and (2) conditional on values of all other covariates. The main effect of interest, i.e., the marginal 
effect of religiosity on the probability that corruption will be accepted is  
 
 
 1 20 1 2 0
Pr 1i
i i jt
i
Corruption
g Religiosity
Religio
Z
i
Z
s ty
   

  



 (2) 
                                                          
4
 La Porta et. al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) show that former British colonies have 
lower levels of corruption. 
5
 See, for example, van Rijckeghem-Weder, 1997; Ades-Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Rauch-Evan, 2000; Paldam, 
2002; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Dreher et al. 2004; Chang-Golden; 2004; Kunicova-Ackerman, 
2005. 
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where   ( )
dG
g z z
dz
 . It is immediately apparent that this marginal effect needs to be evaluated 
at specific values of  1 2,,i i jtReligiosity Z Z  in order to be interpreted in a meaningful way. We can 
also see that interpretations of interaction effects are possible without explicitly including 
interaction terms as explanatory variables. 
In Table 3, we present the average marginal effects (AMEs) from our estimations. In order to 
compute these, equation (2) is calculated for each observation using the estimated coefficients 
and then averaged over all observations. This gives us a first impression of the effects we are 
interested in. Columns (1) to (4) represent estimations with different sets of fixed effects, while 
column (4) represents an estimation with country-level controls, but only year fixed effects. We 
interpret the results as being quite robust across specifications.  
The AME of religiosity (Religiosityij) is estimated to be negative and significantly different from 
zero. This is in line with hypothesis 1, implying that, at the individual level; religiosity can act as 
a deterrent against corrupt behavior. The effect is rather small in size: a 1% increase in individual 
religiosity is on average associated with a 0.05% decrease in individual level acceptance of 
corruption (column 5).  
When we examine the country level acceptance of corruption (Acceptancej), we find a 
significantly positive association with individual level acceptance. This is in line with hypothesis 
2 and shows that, on average, the more corruption that is accepted in society, the more likely an 
individual is to accept corruption. Ranging from 1.093 to 1.301, the effect is quite large in size: a 
1% higher aggregate acceptance of corruption is associated with a higher individual acceptance 
of corruption of around 1.4%.  
At first glance, our micro-level result is at odds with established macro-level results: in purely 
cross-country settings, high levels of religiosity are usually associated with high levels of 
corruption and vice versa (Paldam & Gundlach, 2013). Even though the pure macro-level 
relationship is not of primary interest in our study, this apparent contradiction needs to be 
addressed. 
One possible explanation may be that the variable of interest in our study – acceptance of 
corruption – is conceptually different from the usual macro level indicator – perceived 
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corruption. If we speculate that these two proxies are negatively related – high perceived 
corruption is associated with low acceptance of corruption– a negative correlation between 
individual level religiosity and individual level acceptance of corruption is reasonable
6
 and not at 
all contradictory to existing macro level results. 
Even if we do not subscribe to the conjecture that acceptance of corruption and perceived 
corruption are negatively related, we could interpret the divergence between our micro level 
results and established macro level results as a particular case of the ecological fallacy. One 
could conjecture that, although the relationship between religiosity and acceptance of corruption 
is negative at the individual level, the aggregate relationship appears to be positive due to 
clustering at the country level (Seligson, 2002, pp. 275-276; Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 73).  
A full treatment of the micro-macro dynamics would require a multilevel model, which is 
beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, the positive correlation that we observe in our study 
might be evidence that established aggregate level correlations might suffer from the ecological 
fallacy.  
Moving on to the remaining survey level controls, Incomeij, Unemployedij, 
Financial_Satisfactionij,: we do not find a significant association between these and the 
acceptance of corruption. Individuals that are male, younger, unmarried and less well educated, 
ceteris paribus, are found to have significantly higher acceptance of corruption. There is also 
some evidence that acceptance of corruption differs between individuals of different 
denominations: while Hindus are characterized by lower acceptance of corruption, Jewish, 
Orthodox and Catholics are characterized by higher acceptance of corruption. Buddhist, Muslim 
and Protestant individuals do not differ significantly from individuals of “other religions” 
denomination.    
Though it is not the focus of our study, we briefly describe the results for the country-level 
controls in column 4. The proportion of males in a country, the mean age and the proportion of 
married individuals are not associated with significant differences in acceptance of corruption. 
Surprisingly, the effect of the level of democracy is only weakly significant, while the effect of 
                                                          
6
 Our study does not include an aggregate level proxy for perceived corruption such as the Corruption Perceptions 
Indicator, as this would restrict our sample size significantly. 
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age of democracy is significantly positive, implying that individuals in countries with more 
mature democracies are more accepting of corruption. On a purely aggregate level, Rock (2009) 
found evidence for an inverted-U relationship between corruption and the age of democracy, 
which might be of help explaining this result. We also find that higher levels of GDP are 
associated with significantly lower acceptance of corruption.  
Let us keep in mind that these AMEs represent mere snapshots. In order to gain more complete 
insights into the effects of religiosity, we also have to investigate interaction effects, which is 
achieved by computing the conditional marginal effect of religiosity in equation (2) for varying 
levels in the interacting explanatory variable (leaving all other covariates at their respective 
means) and plotting the marginal effect.  
The first interaction to consider is the interaction of religiosity with itself, in order to check for 
any non-linearities in the effect of religiosity. In Figure 1, we plot the marginal effect of 
religiosity (i.e., the estimated elasticity) for different percentiles of religiosity, holding constant 
all other covariates at their respective means. The effect of religiosity is clearly non-linear: for 
low values of religiosity (below the 30
th
-percentile), the effect is positive; for higher values of 
religiosity (above the 30
th
-percentile), there is a negative effect on the acceptance of corruption. 
This implies that there is a threshold value of religiosity below which corruption is more 
acceptable. We interpret this in the following manner: religious norms for individuals with very 
low religiosity, in general, are less binding, thus, religious anticorruption norms are also less 
binding, resulting in a higher probability that corruption will be accepted. An individual’s 
religiosity actually lowers acceptance of corruption only when his/her religiosity exceeds a 
certain minimum level of religiosity, the threshold level. We can also see that when the marginal 
effect of religiosity on acceptance of corruption becomes stronger, the higher the level of 
religiosity. We conclude that hypothesis 1 is partially confirmed.  
 
We then compare the effect of religiosity on individuals of different religious denominations. In 
Figure 2, we plot the marginal effect of religiosity by religious denomination. Here, we replicate 
Figure 1 for different values of religious denomination. It becomes apparent that the effect of 
religiosity on acceptance of corruption does not systematically differ between individuals of 
different religious denominations. Differences between denominations are strongest for very 
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extreme values of religiosity. We do not find any significant interaction in the effect of 
religiosity (graphs not shown), for country-level denomination averages, implying that country 
level differences in religious denomination do not affect how religiosity and acceptance of 
corruption interact at the individual level. Thus, no further analysis into specific differences 
between religious denominations is required.  
Next, we ask whether the effect of religiosity depends on societal level acceptance of corruption. 
In figure 3, we plot the marginal effect of religiosity for different deciles of aggregated 
acceptance of corruption. We do observe some interaction, but no reversal: the overall trend of 
the marginal effects curve is the same for all deciles of acceptance of corruption (although the 
curve is almost flat for the 99
th
 -percentile). We can see that the effect of individual religiosity is 
more pronounced for lower aggregated acceptance of corruption than for medium to high levels 
of acceptance. This implies that the more accepted corruption is at the societal level, the less of a 
mitigating effect religiosity has on the individual acceptance of corruption. This is in line with 
hypothesis 2.  
For all remaining explanatory variables, we do not find any interaction with the effect of 
religiosity. 
6. Conclusions and outlook 
Although the relevance of institutions for the analysis of human behavior is by now almost 
indisputable, there seems to be little consensus on how informal institutions affect behavior and 
other institutions: “What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive 
influence upon the long-run character of economies?”  (North D. , 1991, S. 111). 
In this study, we have tried to shed some light on the relationship between two different informal 
constraints: religiosity and the acceptance of corruption. We find that, although there is a 
statistically significant association, the effect of religiosity on the acceptance of corruption is 
very small in magnitude. One explanation for this is that religiosity affects the acceptance of 
corruption through different and opposing transmission channels. By promoting intra-group trust 
instead of inter-group trust (Berggren & Bjornskov, 2011), increased religiosity could indirectly 
lead to higher acceptance of corruption. At the same time, increased religiosity should also lead 
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individuals to be more strongly bound by anti-corruption religious norms. Even though our 
exploratory analytical framework cannot differentiate between these two transmission channels, 
our finding that religiosity only lowers acceptance of corruption above a threshold level of 
religiosity is consistent with the existence of opposing transmission channels. Below the 
threshold level, the trust effect prevails, above the threshold level the anti-corruption norm effect 
prevails. Future research into this matter should provide theoretical models that can illuminate 
this conceptual dilemma.   
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Table 1: Description of individual level variables (all taken from World Values Survey) 
Variable Description and source N Mean P50 SD Min Max 
Corruptioni Is someone accepting a bribe acceptable? (f117) 141326 .2872154 0 .4524645 0 1 
Religiosityi 
Weighted average of variables a006 (Religion important in 
life), f028 (How often do you attend religious services?), f034 
(Religious person), f063 (How important is God in your life?). 
141326 .1833668 .4657919 .915573 -2.504312 1.124521 
Incomei 
Self-reported household income, on a scale of societal deciles 
(x047; 10 = highest income group). 
141326 4.541613 4 2.411419 1 10 
Malei Indicator variable for sex of respondent (x001; 1 = Male). 141326 .4909217 0 .4999193 0 1 
Agei Age of respondent (x003). 141326 40.20323 38 15.83598 15 98 
Marriedi Marital status of respondent (x007; 1 = Married). 141326 .578089 1 .4938662 0 1 
Uemployedi Employment status of respondent (x028; 1 = unemployed). 141326 .0975051 0 .2966453 0 1 
Financial_satisfactioni 
Satisfaction with financial situation of household of 
respondent (c006; 10 = satisfied). 
141326 5.537014 6 2.658144 1 10 
Educationi 
Highest educational level attained (x025; 8 = University with 
degree) 
141326 4.46421 4 2.308836 1 8 
Denom_Buddhisti 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Buddhist) 
141326 0.022395 0 0.147965 0 1 
Denom_Hindii Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Hindi) 141326 0.0455755 0 0.2085633 0 1 
Denom_Jewishi 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Jewish) 
141326 0.0037997 0 0.0615249 0 1 
Denom_Muslimi 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Muslim) 
141326 0.2098552 0 0.4072066 0 1 
Denom_Orthodoxi 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Orthodox) 
141326 0.1063499 0 0.308286 0 1 
Denom_Protestanti 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Protestant) 
141326 0.18959 0 0.391978 0 1 
Denom_Catholici 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 
Catholic) 
141326 0.1632042 0 0.3695532 0 1 
Denom_Otheri Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Other) 141326 0.2592304 0 0.4382138 0 1 
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Table 2: Description of country level variables 
Variable Description and source N Mean P50 SD Min Max 
Religiosityj Country average of Religiosityi 141326 0.1857126 0.3470483 0.5475786 -1.138073 0.976903 
Acceptancej Country average of Acceptancei 141326 0.2901851 0.2684564 0.1689217 0 1 
Malej Country average of Malei 141326 0 0.4957411 0 0.343 0.5974026 
Agej Country average of Agei 141326 40.03516 39.69038 5.105734 28.69082 52.45044 
Marriedj Country average of Marriedi 141326 1 0.5667456 0 0.1434263 0.8352357 
Unemployedj Country average of Unemployedi 141326 0.1006594 0.0841794 0.0687431 0 0.3673333 
Denom_Buddhistj Country average of Denom_Buddhisti 141326 0.0220085 0.0007813 0.1083848 0 0.9680574 
Denom_Hindij Country average of Denom_Hindii 141326 0 0 0 0 0.8824 
Denom_Jewishj Country average of Denom_Jewishi 141326 0 0.0008326 0 0 0.0637138 
Denom_Muslimj Country average of Denom_Muslimi 141326 0.2054172 0.0106285 0.3451973 0 0.9888559 
Denom_Orthodoxj Country average of Denom_Orthodoxi 141326 0.1042883 0.0032026 0.2344388 0 0.9225621 
Denom_Protestantj Country average of Denom_Protestanti 141326 0.1602449 0.0470628 0.226506 0 0.8850347 
Denom_Catholicj Country average of Denom_Catholici 141326 0.2544323 0.1018252 0.2978343 0 0.944 
Colonial_2j 
Indicator variable for Spanish colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0.016232 0 0.126367 0 1 
Colonial_3j 
Indicator variable for Italian colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0.1433636 0 0.3504445 0 1 
Colonial_4j 
Indicator variable for U.S. colonial origin (Teorell & Hadenius, 
2007) 141326 0.0083566 0 0.0910318 0 1 
Colonial_5j 
Indicator variable for British colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0.237918 0 0.4258102 0 1 
Colonial_6j 
Indicator variable for French colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0 0 0 0 1 
Colonial_7j 
Indicator variable for Portuguese colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0.0296548 0 0.1696338 0 1 
Colonial_8j 
Indicator variable for Belgian colonial origin (Teorell & 
Hadenius, 2007) 141326 0.0098496 0 0.0987554 0 1 
GDPj Real GDP per capita (United Nations Statistics Division 2009). 141326 6823.824 2500.875 10127.43 163.3393 40112 
Democracyj 
Democracy score. Variable that combines the Freedom House 
democracy score with the imputed polity score (QOG 2013). 
141326 7.169732 8.25 2.702349 0 10 
Age_Democracyj 
Age of democracy. Counts the number of interrupted years of 
democracy up to year of observation. Own calculation using 
the revised combined polity score (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) 141326 27.74922 21 21.05904 0 62 
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Table 3: Average marginal effects of Probit estimations (Dependent variable: Acceptance of corruption) 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Religiosityij -0.0472*** -0.0477*** -0.0478*** -0.0493*** 
 (0.00825) (0.00826) (0.00831) (0.00952) 
Acceptancej 1.093*** 1.177*** 1.301*** 1.190*** 
 (0.0962) (0.161) (0.166) (0.103) 
Incomeij 1.093*** 0.0229 0.0268 -0.000938 
 (0.0962) (0.0379) (0.0387) (0.0386) 
Maleij 0.0568*** 0.0593*** 0.0604*** 0.0552*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0171) (0.0185) 
Ageij -0.381*** -0.413*** -0.419*** -0.406*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0431) (0.0444) (0.0461) 
Marriedij -0.0864*** -0.0856*** -0.0893*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0144) 
Uemployedij -0.00661 0.0161 0.0167 0.0162 
 (0.0276) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0218) 
Financial_satisfactionij 0.0286 0.0105 0.0212 0.0450* 
 (0.0227) (0.0263) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
Educationij -0.163*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0270) 
Denom_Buddhistij 0.143** 0.141** 0.143** 0.133* 
 (0.0622) (0.0597) (0.0595) (0.0713) 
Denom_Hindiij -0.308*** -0.314*** -0.302*** -0.305*** 
 (0.0941) (0.0931) (0.0933) (0.0925) 
Denom_Jewishij 0.304*** 0.312*** 0.316*** 0.294*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0581) (0.0585) (0.0585) 
Denom_Muslimij -0.0843 -0.0796 -0.0781 -0.106 
 (0.0759) (0.0770) (0.0768) (0.0805) 
Denom_Orthodoxij 0.0951** 0.100** 0.104** 0.108** 
 (0.0427) (0.0421) (0.0417) (0.0459) 
Denom_Protestantij -0.0110 -0.00201 0.000238 -0.0254 
 (0.0588) (0.0594) (0.0598) (0.0568) 
Denom_Catholicij 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0331) 
Malej    -0.155 
    (0.328) 
Agej    -0.316 
    (0.254) 
Marriedj    0.153 
    (0.207) 
Unemployedj    -0.0907** 
    (0.0363) 
GDPj    -0.0471*** 
    (0.0179) 
Democracyj    -0.154* 
    (0.0870) 
Age_Democracyj    0.276*** 
    (0.0494) 
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Denom_Buddhistj    -0.0109*** 
    (0.00262) 
Denom_Hindij    0.000831 
    (0.00978) 
Denom_Jewishj    0.00921 
    (0.00716) 
Denom_Muslimj    0.0697 
    (0.0545) 
Denom_Orthodoxj    0.0136 
    (0.0177) 
Denom_Protestantj    0.00622 
    (0.0283) 
Denom_Catholicj    0.0240 
    (0.0404) 
     
Fixed effects none country country, year year 
     
Countries 80 80 80 73 
Years 18 18 18 16 
     
Observations 164,209 164,209 164,209 141,326 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2084 0.2195 0.2213 0.2115 
Estimation with Probit (with number of respondents per country as weights). Reported numbers are estimated 
elasticities (with respect to a 1% change for continuous variables and a 1 unit change for dummy variables). Country 
cluster robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table 4: Selected texts on theft and bribery from main sources of major world religions 
Judaism Judeo-Christian Christianity Islam Buddhism Hinduism 
Maimonides, 
Mishneh Torah, 
Hilchot Gezeilah 1:2 
 It is forbidden to rob 
or to steal even a 
minor amount from 
either a Jew or a 
gentile. 
 
Sefer HaChinuch, 
259  
And it is biblically 
forbidden to steal 
even a minor amount; 
even a gentile - it is 
forbidden to steal 
from him or to cheat 
him. And if you stole 
from him or cheated 
him you must return 
the stolen money or 
object. 
 
Shulchan Aruch 
Choshen Mishpat 
359:1 
It is forbidden to rob 
or to cheat even a 
minor amount from 
either a Jew or a 
gentile. 
 
 Shulchan Aruch 
(Code of Jewish 
Law) Choshen 
Mishpat 348:2 
Old Testament 
Exodus 20:14-16  
“You shall not steal.“ 
 
Exodus 23:7-9  
“Do not accept a bribe, for a 
bribe blinds those who see 
and twists the words of the 
innocent. 
 
Leviticus 19:10-12 
“‘Do not steal. “‘Do not lie. 
“‘Do not deceive one 
another.  
 
Deuteronomy 5:18-20 
“You shall not steal. 
 
1 Samuel 8:2-4  
But his sons did not follow 
his ways. They turned aside 
after dishonest gain and 
accepted bribes and 
perverted justice. 
 
Job 36:17-19  
Be careful that no one 
entices you by riches; do not 
let a large bribe turn you 
aside. 
 
Psalm 15:4-5  
who lends money to the 
poor without interest; who 
does not accept a bribe 
against the innocent. 
New Testament 
Matthew 15:18-20  
For out of the heart come 
evil thoughts—murder, 
adultery, sexual 
immorality,theft, false 
testimony, slander. 
 
Matthew 19:17-19 
“Which ones?” he inquired. 
Jesus replied, “‘You shall 
not murder, you shall not 
commit adultery, you shall 
not steal, you shall not give 
false testimony,  
 
Mark 7:20-22  
For it is from within, out of 
a person’s heart, that evil 
thoughts come—sexual 
immorality, theft, murder, 
 
Luke 18:19-21  
You know the 
commandments: ‘You shall 
not commit adultery, you 
shall not murder, you shall 
not steal, you shall not give 
false testimony, honor your 
father and mother.’ ” 
 
John 10:9-11 
The thief comes only 
to steal and kill and destroy; 
I have come that they may 
have life, and have it to the 
Qur’an 
Al-Baqara, Chapter #2, 
Verse #188 (Pickthal) 
And eat not up your 
property among yourselves 
in vanity, nor seek by it to 
gain the hearing of the 
judges that ye may 
knowingly devour a portion 
of the property of others 
wrongfully.  
 
 Al-Maeda, Chapter #5, 
Verse #38 
“As for the thief, both male 
and female, cut off their 
hands. It is the reward of 
their own deeds, an 
exemplary punishment from 
Allah. Allah is Mighty, 
Wise.” 
 
  An-Nisa, Chapter #4, 
Verse #161 
“And of their taking usury 
when they were forbidden 
it, and of their devouring 
people's wealth by false 
pretences, We have 
prepared for those of them 
who disbelieve a painful 
doom. 
  
Hud, Chapter #11 Verse 
#85 
 O my people! Give full 
Second Precepts Of 
Buddhism  
“I undertake the 
training rule to abstain 
from taking what is 
not given“ 
  
Buddha’s teaching in  
Aṅguttaranikāya 
“Monks, through 
repeated stealing and 
robbing, one is liable 
to be 
reborn in hell or in the 
animal realm or in the 
realm of hungry 
ghosts. At the very 
least, stealing leads to 
damage and loss of 
property.” 
  
Mahasi Sayadaw in  
Sallekha Sutta 
 “Other people may 
steal or loot what is 
not given by the 
owner.We will avoid 
doing so” 
 
Dhammika Sutta, v. 
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A disciple then 
knowing [the law] 
should refrain from 
stealing anything at 
any place; should not 
The  10 Vedic 
Restraints-
YAMA 3: 
Asteya, 
Nonstealing 
Uphold the virtue 
of non stealing, 
neither thieving, 
coveting nor 
failing to repay 
debt. Control your 
desires and live 
within your 
means. Do not use 
borrowed 
resources for 
unintended 
purposes or keep 
them past due. Do 
not gamble or 
defraud others. Do 
not renege on 
promises. Do not 
use others' name, 
words, resources 
or rights without 
permission and 
acknowledgment. 
 
 The  10 Vedic 
Restraints-
YAMA 8: 
Arjava, Honesty 
Maintain honesty, 
renouncing 
deception and 
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Source: (Judism) Student, Gil (2000). Theft from Gentiles. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/theft.html (Judeo-Christian 
and Christianity) Bible- New International Version, (2011) search words „theft“ „steal“ „bribe“, retrieved November 11, 2011 from: 
http://www.biblegateway.com/, (Islam-Qur‘an) Pickthall, Mohammed M. (1995). The meaning of the glorious Qur’an. New Delhi: Madhur Sandesh Sangam, 
retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://www.khayma.com/librarians/call2islaam/quran/pickthall/index.html. (Islam-Hadith) Abu-Dawud (n.a.), Sunan Abu-
Dawud, Kitab Al-Aqdiyah, Book #24, Hadith #3573 and Book #23, Hadith #3534, Retrieved November 11, 2011 from  
http://www.yanabi.com/Hadith.aspx?HadithID=143455 and http://www.yanabi.com/Hadith.aspx?HadithID=143848 (Buddhism) Wat Palelai Singapore (n.a.). 
Sila and the five percepts. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from: https://sites.google.com/site/watpalelai/buddhism/practices/the-five-precepts.Venerable Mahāsī 
Sayādaw (2006). A Discourse on the Sallekha Sutta. Bhikkhu Pesala, Association for Insight Meditation. 
http://www.dhammapath.com/resources/Mahasi_2/A%20Discourse%20on%20the%20Sallekha%20Sutta.pdf (Hindusm) Vedic Knowledge online (n.a.), Yamas 
and Niyamas, retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://veda.wikidot.com/yama-niyama#toc5
 Anyone who steals 
even a minor amount 
violates the 
prohibition of 
[Leviticus 19:11] 
"You shall not steal" 
and is required to 
repay [the amount 
stolen] whether one 
steals from a Jew or a 
gentile. 
Whoever does these things 
will never be shaken. 
 
Ecclesiastes 7:6-8 
Extortion turns a wise 
person into a fool, and a 
bribe corrupts the heart. 
 
 Isaiah 33:14-16 
Those who walk righteously 
and speak what is right, who 
reject gain from extortion 
and keep their hands from 
accepting bribes, who stop 
their ears against plots of 
murder and shut their eyes 
against contemplating evil— 
 
Amos 5:11-13 
For I know how many are 
your offenses and how great 
your sins. There are those 
who oppress the innocent 
and take bribes and deprive 
the poor of justice in the 
courts. 
full. 
 
Romans 2:20-22  
you, then, who teach others, 
do you not teach yourself? 
You who preach 
against stealing, do you 
steal? 
 
Ephesians 4:27-29 
Anyone who has 
been stealing must steal no 
longer, but must work, 
doing something useful with 
their own hands, that they 
may have something to 
share with those in need.  
 
Revelation 9:20-21  
Nor did they repent of their 
murders, their magic arts, 
their sexual immorality or 
their thefts. 
measure and full weight in 
justice, and wrong not 
people in respect of their 
goods. And do not evil in 
the earth, causing 
corruption. 
 
Hadith 
Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 
#24, Hadith #3573 
Narrated Abdullah ibn Amr 
ibn al-As: 
“The Apostle of Allah 
(peace be upon him) cursed 
the one who offers 
bribe as well as one who 
accepts bribe.” 
 
Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 
#23, Hadith #3534 
 Narrated AbuUmamah: The 
Prophet said: If anyone 
intercedes for his brother 
and he presents a gift to him 
for it and he accepts it, he 
approaches a great door of 
the doors of usury. 
cause another to steal 
anything, should not 
consent to the acts of 
those who steal 
anything, should 
avoid every kind of 
theft. 
wrongdoing. Act 
honorably even in 
hard times. Obey 
the laws of your 
nation and locale. 
Pay your taxes. 
Be 
straightforward in 
business. Do an 
honest day's work. 
Do not bribe or 
accept bribes. Do 
not cheat, deceive 
or circumvent to 
achieve an end. 
Be frank with 
yourself. Face and 
accept your faults 
without blaming 
them on others. 
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of religiosity 
 
 
Figure 2: Marginal effect of religiosity by religious denomination 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of religiosity by acceptance of corruption (country) 
 
 
  
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 20 40 60 80 100
percentiles of religiosity
Marginal effect of religiosity at 1-percentile of acceptance
Marginal effect of religiosity at 25-percentile of acceptance
Marginal effect of religiosity at 50-percentile of acceptance
Marginal effect of religiosity at 75-percentile of acceptance
Marginal effect of religiosity at 99-percentile of acceptance
27 
 
References 
Ades, A. D. (1997). National Champions and Corruption: Some Un-pleasant Interventionist Arithmetic. 
The Economic Journal , 107 (443), 1023-1042. 
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition, and Corruption. The American Economic Review , 
89 (4), 982-993. 
Al-Marhubi, F. (2004). The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis. Contemporary 
Economic Policy , 2 (3), 394-406. 
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2003). The political economy of institutions and corruption in American 
states. Journal of Theoretical Politics , 15 (3), 341–365. 
Armantier, O., & Boly, A. (2011). A controlled field experiment on corruption. European Economic 
Review , 55 (8), 1072-1082. 
Barreto, R. A. (2000). Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model. European Economic 
Review , 44 (1), 35-60. 
Barreto, R. A., & Alm, J. (2003). Corruption, Optimal Taxation, and Growth. Public Finance Review , 31 
(10), 1-34. 
Basu, P. K. (2006). Corruption: A Theoretical Perspective and Relevance for Economic Growth. 
International Review of Business Research Papers , 2 (2), 59-68. 
Beets, S. D. (2007). Global corruption and religion: an empirical examination. Journal of Global Ethics , 
3 (1), 69-85. 
Berggren, N., & Bjornskov, C. (2011). Is the Importance of Religion in Daily Life Related to Social 
Trust? Cross-Country and Cross-State Comparison. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 80, 
459-480. 
Bhattarai, P. C. (2009). Countering Corruption: Globally or Locally? Nepalese Journal of Public Policy 
and Governance , XXXIV (1), 89-98. 
Bible-New International Version. (2011). search words: „”theft“”, „”steal“”, „” ri e”“. Retrieved 
November 11, 2011, from Bible Gateway: http://www.biblegateway.com/ 
Braun, M., & Di Tella, R. (2004). Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption. Economics and Politics 
, 16 (1), 77-100. 
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public Economics , 
87 (7-8), 1801–1824. 
Caiden, G. E. (1988). Toward a General Theory of Official Corruption. Asian Journal of Public 
Administration , 10 (1), 3-26. 
28 
 
Chadwick, B. A., & Top, B. L. (1993). Religiosity and Delinquency among LDS Adolescents. Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion , 32 (1), 51-67. 
Chang, E. C., & Golden, M. A. (2007). Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption. British 
Journal of Political Science , 37 (1), 115-137. 
Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C., & McCorriston, S. (2004). Corruption around the world: Evidence from a 
structural model. Journal of Comparative Economics , 35 (3), 443-466. 
Duasa, J. (2008). Tendency of corruption and its determinants among public servants: A case study on 
Malaysia. MPRA (Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper 11562 , 1-15 . 
Durkheim, E. (1912/1915). The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Chicago: Free Press. 
Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. T. (1999). Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth. Journal of 
Political Economy , 107 (2), 270-293. 
Esarey, J., & Chirillo, G. (2012). `Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional 
Context. Rice University Staff papers , 1-31. 
Flavin, P., & Ledet, R. (2008). Religiosity and Government Corruption in the American States. 
Proceedings of the Annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference (pp. 1-22). Chicago: MPSA 
Annual National Conference. 
Gatti, R., Paternostro, S., & Rigolini, J. (2003). Individual attitudes toward corruption: do social effects 
matter? Policy research working paper series 3122 , 1-24. 
Guerrero, M. A., & Rodriguez-Oreggia, E. (2008). On the individual decisions to commit corruption: A 
methodological complement. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 65 (2), 357-372. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2003). People’s opium? Religion and economic attitudes. Journal 
of Monetary Economics , 50, 225-82. 
Herzfeld, T., & Weiss, C. (2003). Corruption and Legal (In)Effectiveness: An Em-pirical Investigation. 
European Journal of Political Economy , 19 (2003), 621-632. 
Hirschi, T., & Stark, R. (1969). Hellfire and delinquency. Social Problems , 17 (2), 202-13. 
Iannaccone, L. R. (1998). Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic Literature , 
XXXVI (September 1998), 1465–1496. 
Jagodzinski, W. (2009). The Impact of Religion on Values and Behavior. Kwansei Gakuin University 
School of Sociology Journal , 107, 19-34. 
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys , 15 (1), 71-121. 
Khan, M. (2006). Corruption and Governance. In K. S. Jomo, & B. Fine, the New Development 
Economics (pp. 200-21). London and New Delhi: Zed Press and Tulika. 
29 
 
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development. San 
Francisco: Harper and Row. 
Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development- The Nature 
of Moral Stages (Vol. II). San Francisco: Harper and Row. 
Kunicova, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on 
corruption. British Journal of Political Science , 35 (4), 573-606. 
La Porta, R., De-Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of Government. Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization , 15 (1), 222–79. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. (1999). Corruption in empirical research- a review. Transparency International 
Working Paper , 1-17. 
Lederman, D., Loayza, N., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions 
matter. Economics and Politics , 17 (1), 1-35. 
Luxmoore, J. (1999). Churches urged to help fight global corruption. Catholic New Times , 23 (2), 12-13. 
Macrae, J. (1982). Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach. 
World Development , 10 (8), 677-87. 
Marquette, H. (2010). Corruption, religion and moral development. Working Paper- University of 
Birmingham , 1-30. 
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 
1800-2002. University of Maryland, College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM). 
Matei, L., & Matei, A. (2009). Corruption in the Public Organization towards a Model of Cost – Benefit 
Analysis for the Anti–corruption Strategies. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences , 27, 145-
71. 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 110 (3), 681-712. 
Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure. Journal of Public 
Economics , 69 (1998), 263-279. 
Mauro, P. (2002). The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure. In A. J. Heidenheimer, 
& M. Johnston, Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts (pp. 339-52). New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Middleton, R., & Putney, S. (1962). Religion, normative standards, and behavior. Sociometry , 25 (2), 
141-52. 
Mishra, A. (2006). Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives. World Development , 34 (2), 
349-358. 
30 
 
Mutascu, M. (2010). Corruption, Social Welfare, Culture and Religion in European Union 27. Transition 
Studies Review , 16 (4), 908-917. 
Nas, T., Price, A. C., & Weber, C. T. (1986). A policy-oriented theory of corruption. The American 
Political Science Review , 80 (1), 107-119. 
Naumova, S. (2009). Legal-Sociological Parameters of the Fight Against Crime and Social Deviance. In 
M. Serafimova, S. Hunt, M. Marinov, & V. Vladov, Sociology and Law: The 150th Anniversary of Emile 
Durkheim 1858-1917 (pp. 11-22). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
North, C. M., Orman, W. H., & Gwin, C. R. (2013). Religion, Corruption, and the Rule of Law. Journal 
of Money, Credit & Banking , 45 (5), 757-779. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 5 (1), 97-112. 
Paldam, M. (2001). Corruption and religion: adding to the economic model. Kyklos , 54 (2-3), 383-414. 
Paldam, M. (2002). The big pattern of corruption. Economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics. 
European Journal of Political Economy , 18 (2), 215-40. 
Paldam, M., & Gundlach, E. (2013). The Religious Transition. A Long-run Perspective. Public Choice , 
156 (1-2), 105-123. 
Pickthall, M. M. (1995). The meaning of the glorious Qur’an. Retrieved November 11, 2011, from 
http://www.khayma.com/librarians/call2islaam/quran/pickthall/index.html 
Power, C., & Kohlberg, L. (1981). Moral Development, Religious Thinking, and the Question of a 
Seventh Stage. In C. Power, & L. Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development Vol. I: Philosophy of Moral 
Development. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. 
Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley-
Interscience. 
Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less 
developed countries. Journal of Public Economics , 75 (1), 49-71. 
Rock, M. T. (2009). Corruption and Democracy. The Journal of Development Studies , 45 (1), 55-75. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government- Causes, Consequences and Reform. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sandholtz, W., & Gray, M. M. (2003). International Integration and National Corruption. International 
Organization , 57 (4), 761-800. 
Seligson, M. A. (2002). The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological 
Fallacy? Comparative Politics , 34 (3), 273-292. 
31 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 108, 599-617. 
Stark, R., & Bainbridge, W. S. (1985). The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult 
Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Stark, R., Kent, L., & Doyle, D. P. (1982). Religion and Delinquency: the Ecology of a "Lost" 
Relationship. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency , 19 (1), 4-24. 
Student, G. (2000). Theft from Gentiles. Retrieved November 11, 2011, from The Real Truth about the 
Talmud: http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/theft.html 
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and Corruption. Journal of Development 
Economics , 64, 25-55. 
Tavares, J. (2003). Does foreign aid corrupt? Economic Letters , 79, 99-106. 
Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2007). Determinants of Democratization: Taking Stock of the Large-N 
Evidence. In D. Berg-Schlosser, Democratization: The State of the Art (The World of Political Science) 
(pp. 69-96). Leverkusen Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Tittle, C. R., & Welch, M. R. (1983). Religiosity and deviances: toward a contingency theory of 
constraining effects. Social Forces , 61 (3), 653-82. 
Transparency International. (2006). Transparency International. Retrieved March 1, 2011, from 
Handbook: Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement: 
http://www.transparency.org./global_priorities/public_contracting 
Transparency International. (2011). Transparency International. Retrieved October 9, 2011, from 
Mission Statement: http://www.transparency.org.au/mission.php 
Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study. Journal of Public Economics , 
76 (2000), 399–457. 
Van Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. (1997). Corruption and Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the 
Civil Service Cause Corruption? IMF Working Paper , 97 (73), 1-56. 
VanVleet, R. K., Cockayne, J., & R, F. T. (1999). Examining Religion as a Preventative Factor to 
Delinquency. Utah Criminal Justice Center , 1-18. 
Weber, M. (2010). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. North Charleston, South Carolina: 
Createspace. 
Wei, S.-J. (1997). Why is Corruption so Much More Taxing than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills. NBER 
Working Papers , 6255, 1-17. 
World Bank. (2004, April 8). World Bank. Retrieved October 23, 2011, from The Costs of Corruption: 
http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 
32 
 
You, J.-S., & Khagram, S. (2005). A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption. American 
Sociological Review , 70 (1), 136-157. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Long-Term Effect of Slavery on Violent Crime: 
Evidence from US Counties* 
                                                          
*
I would like to thank Boban Aleksandrovic, Tom Gobien, Jerg Gutmann, Shima’a Hanafy, Helmut Leipold, Florian 
Neumeier, John Pfaff, Elisabeth Schulte, and Christian Traxler for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also 
thank the participants at the 2013MACIE brown bag summer seminar in Marburg for their helpful comments. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
1 
 
The Long-Term Effect of Slavery on Violent Crime: Evidence from US Counties 
 
November 2013 
 
Abstract: 
This study is the first to empirically investigate the long-term relationship between slavery and violence 
in USA. Although qualitative evidence shows that slavery has been a key factor behind the prevalence of 
violence, especially in South USA (Cash, 1941; Franklin, 1956; Gastil, 1971; Wyatt-Brown, 1986), no 
empirical evidence supports this claim so far. I propose that the proportion of slaves in a certain county in 
1860 is positively correlated with the rate of violent crimes in 2000. As violence was extensively used to 
control slaves for hundreds of years, a culture of violence was formed and persisted through time. 
Extending Engermann and Sokoloff’s hypotheses (1997; 2002), I empirically examine two hypotheses: 
(1) slavery has a long-term effect on violent crime. (2) Such long-term effect is mainly transmitted 
through inequality. The results show that slavery in 1860 is positively associated with violent crime in 
2000. Testing the second hypothesis, I find that land inequality in 1860 has a long-term significant effect 
on contemporary violent crime. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 18
th
 century, it is noticeable that violence is more prevalent in Southern USA than other parts of 
the United States (Ayers, 1991; Nisbett, 1993). Clarke (1998, p. 275) states that “Violence was as much a 
part of the Southern landscape and culture as azalea festivals and bourbon whiskey”. A considerable body 
of literature investigates the reason behind the prevalence of violence in South USA, a phenomenon 
coined as “Southern Violence” (Hackney, 1969; Gastil, 1971; Wasserman, 1977). Southern violence 
continued up till today. In 2011, the South was the region with the highest violent crime rate (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011). According to the 2011 U.S. Peace Index that measures level of 
peacefulness, or “absence of violence” on state level, the South was the least peaceful region in the 
United States, having nine of the ten nationally most violent states (Institute for Economics and Peace, 
2011). Many studies hypothesize that the institution of slavery was an important factor behind this culture 
of Southern violence (Nash, Jeffrey, Frederick, Davis, & Winkler, 2003, p. 362; Cardyn, 2002; West, 
2012).   
This study fills an important gap in the economic and sociological literature by empirically investigating 
the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the US. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 
2002) argue that the existence of slavery in South USA led to significant inequality between different 
segments of the population. This inequality persisted over time and led to different levels of economic 
development in the long run (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002). Moreover, 
Engerman and Sokoloff argue that historical inequality negatively affected important institutions such as 
patents (Khan & Sokoloff, 1998), suffrage (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005), provisions of primary 
education (Mariscal & Sokoloff, 2000) and taxation (Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007). Extending Engerman and 
Sokoloff’s thesis (1997; 2002), I empirically examine two hypotheses: (1) slavery has a long-term effect 
on crime. (2) Such a long-term effect is mainly transmitted through economic inequality.  
The results show that slavery in 1860 positively affects violent crime in 2000. Testing for the second 
hypothesis, I find a significant positive long-term relationship between land inequality in 1860 and 
contemporary violent crime. The results are robust to controlling for three possible channels of inequality 
transmission between violent crime and the main explanatory variable. These channels of transmission are 
income per capita, poverty level and income inequality. Moreover, the results are robust when controlling 
for other contemporary variables affecting violent crime. 
This study is divided into six sections. The next section provides a theoretical background on the relation 
between the legacy of slavery and violence. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and data. Section 4 
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presents results on the empirical relationship between slavery and contemporary violent crime. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
In a series of papers, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2002; 2005) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) 
argue that the existence of certain factor endowments in 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries was detrimental to long-
term economic development in New World countries. These factor endowments are mainly soil, climate, 
and the size of labor supply, consisting primarily of slaves (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002, p. 17). The 
differences in availability of these three factors led to the use of different production processes in different 
colonies, leading to different degrees of initial wealth concentration, human capital, and political power. 
This initial inequality significantly influenced the type of institutions set up in a given country. These 
institutions persisted over time and led to different levels of economic development in the longer run 
(Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002). 
Relying mainly on qualitative evidence, Engerman and Sokoloff used this line of reasoning to argue that 
historical inequality negatively affected important institutions such as patents (Khan & Sokoloff, 1998), 
suffrage (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005), provisions of primary education (Mariscal & Sokoloff, 2000) and 
taxation (Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007). Considerable empirical research follows suit and investigates the long-
term effect of certain institutions, in particular slavery, on various economic outcomes. Recent findings 
indicate that slavery has a persistent and long-lasting effect on income inequality (Bertocchi & Dimico, 
2011), economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; Nunn, 2008; Maloney & 
Caicedo, 2012), racial educational inequality (Bertocchi & Dimico, 2012), and political attitudes 
(Acharya, Blackwell, & Sen, 2013). Investigating the long-run development of different municipalities in 
Columbia, Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012) find that the historical presence of slavery is 
associated with an increase in poverty rate and a reduction in school enrollment, vaccination coverage, 
and public good provision.  
There has been a recent interest in investigating the long-term effect of historical institutions on violent 
behavior. Jha (2008) argues that inter-ethnic medieval trade has left a lasting legacy on the patterns of 
religious violence between Hindus and Muslims in India. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) demonstrate that 
the same places in Germany that saw violent attacks on Jews during the plague also showed more anti-
Semitic attitudes over half a millennium later. As for the United States, a considerable body of 
sociological literature investigates the reason behind the prevalence of violence in the South, a 
phenomenon coined as “Southern Violence” (Hackney, 1969; Gastil, 1971; Wasserman, 1977). Since the 
18
th
 century, it was noticeable that the violence was far more prevalent in the South than other parts of the 
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United States (Ayers, 1991; Nisbett, 1993). Messner, Baller and Zevengergen (2005, p. 633) state that 
“distinctive historical experiences in the South gave rise to cultural orientations conducive to violence.” 
According to Ousey (2000, p. 264), there is remarkable continuity in the position of the South as the most 
homicidal region of the United States, having the highest homicide rate every year between 1960 and 
1997. Interestingly, this finding is identical to that of Redfield (1880), which observed that violent crime 
rates were highest in the Southern United States in mid 19
th
 century. 
 
Many studies try to explain this phenomenon. Most contemporary researchers view the empirical studies 
of Hackney (1969) and Gastil (1971) as starting points for explaining the source of the South’s high 
violence rates (Ousey, 2000, p. 268). Hackney and Gastil argue that Southern violence can be attributed 
primarily to a unique cultural pattern which developed in the South and which persists, despite 
considerable economic and structural change in this region, to produce a consistently high rate of 
interpersonal violence. Gastil (1971) declare that the degree of ‘Southernness’ in the culture is a more 
powerful predictor of violence than socioeconomic factors, such as educations, age, or economic status. 
Although Loftin and Hill (1974) refute Gastil’s latter claim, a considerable body of research, mainly 
sociological, hypothesize that Southern violence stems from specific cultural factors (Bruce, 1979; 
McCall, Kenneth, & Cohen, 1992; Clarke, 1998; Dixon & Lixotte, 1987; Ellison, 1991; Hayes & Lee, 
2005). 
 
In an attempt to explain the Southern culture of violence, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) identify four major 
explanations for Southern violence, including higher temperatures, greater poverty, and the tradition of 
slavery. Nevertheless, they argue that the importance of honor in the South is perhaps greater than any of 
the other explanations (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996, p. 3). The authors argue that the South “had and to a 
substantial degree, and still has, a type of culture of honor” (p. xiv). This culture of honor places extreme 
importance on the ability to react towards social insults and economic challenges. According to Nisbett 
and Cohen, in a “culture of honor,” a reputation for toughness and strength is worth great economic value 
(p. xv).  
 
Honor-based cultures develop in response to economic instability and minimal state protection against 
theft of property (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996, p. 4). Herding societies often demonstrate these characteristics 
since a loss of a herd represented a loss of entire wealth (Nisbett & Cohen, p. 5). The Scotch-Irish, 
descendants of Celtic herdsman, developed rural herding communities along the Appalachians and in the 
South. Consequently, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) believe that the Southern culture of honor derives from 
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the herding economy brought to the South by the earliest settlers and practiced by them for many decades 
thereafter.  
 
Confirming the relation between herding and Southern violence, Grosjean (2011) empirically finds that 
historical Scot or Scots-Irish presence is associated with higher contemporary homicide, particularly by 
white offenders. The author also finds that the culture of honor was transmitted to subsequent generations; 
but only in the South and, more generally, where historical institutional quality was low. Other studies 
reach a similar conclusion (Wyatt-Brown, 2001; Baller, Zevenbergen, & Messner, 2009; Ousey & Lee, 
2010). Nevertheless, other studies find little support for the proposition that herding affects Southern 
culture of violence (Chu, Rivera, & Loftin, 2000; Altheimer, 2013). 
 
Among the reasons Nisbett and Cohen (1996) gave for Southern culture of violence is the tradition of 
slavery. Violence was extensively used by slaveholders to control slaves for hundreds of years. Being a 
slaveholder himself, Thomas Jefferson, founding father and the 3
rd
 president of the United States, points 
out that the unrestrained authority wielded by slaveholders tended to breed reckless behavior and 
shortness of temper, characteristics passed from one generation of masters to the next (cited in (Ayers, 
1991). Social historians have documented the brutality and violence of African enslavement in the South 
(Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Rice, 1975; Mullin, 1995; Fogel & Engerman, 1989; Campbell, 1989; 
Blassingame, 1972). Many studies propose that the institution of slavery has been a key factor behind the 
Southern culture of violence (Cash, 1941; Franklin, 1956; Gastil, 1971; Wyatt-Brown, 1986).  
 
This study is the first to empirically investigate the relation between slavery and violence in USA. I 
hypothesize that the proportion of slaves in a certain county in 1860 is positively correlated with the rate 
of violent crimes in 2000. As violence was extensively used to control slaves for hundreds of years, a 
culture of violence was formed and persisted until our current time. Moreover, according to Engermann 
and Sokoloff’s hypothesis, the initial presence of certain factor endowments explains the development of 
agricultural production methods based on slave labor, which in turn resulted in extreme economic 
inequality. They state that “the greater efficiency of the very large plantations, and the overwhelming 
fraction of the populations that came to be black and slave, made the distributions of wealth and human 
capital extremely unequal.” (Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000, p. 221). Such inequality persisted over time 
and led to different economic outcomes in the long run (Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2002). Many 
studies find a significant positive relation between inequality and violent crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & 
Loayza, 2002; Wilkinson, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 1998; Kelly, 2000; Blau & Blau, 1982). Consequently, 
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my second hypothesis is that the initial inequality in land ownership is positively related to level of 
violence in a given county.  
3. Estimation strategy and data 
Following existing empirical literature, I conduct the analysis at the county level (Gould, Weinberg, & 
Mustard, 2002; Lott & Mustard, 1997; Hull & Frederick, 1995; Hull, 2000). Using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression, I first report baseline estimates of regressing violent crime in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
2000, respectively, on population proportion in slavery in 1860. For this purpose, I use a reduced model: 
 
                                                                                (I) 
 
Counties are indicated by subscript  ,   is violent crime per 100,000 population in the respective year, 
      is the proportion of slaves to total population in 1860,         is the population density in 1860, 
           is a dummy variable for slave states in 1860,          is a dummy variable for regional 
divisions in USA,   is our parameter of interest. I intermittently add dummies for slave state as well as 
regional divisions to even-numbered columns.  
 
I then test for channels of transmission between slavery and violent crime using the following model: 
 
                                                              
                                                                                                      (II) 
 
         is the Gini coefficient of land inequality in 1860,      is Gini income coefficient in 2000, 
       is the log of income per capita in 2000,         is the proportion of population in poverty in 
2000. 
 
Adding further contemporary controls, I finally estimate the following model
1
: 
 
                                                       
 
               
                                                                                                            (III) 
 
                                                          
1
 I do not include        when counting for further contemporary controls due to multicollinearity. 
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   is a set that includes contemporary controls for county characteristics that may affect crime rate. These 
contemporary controls are population per square mile, unemployment rate, proportion of population aged 
18-34 (Youth), proportion of population with at least a high school degree (Educational Attainment), 
proportion of Hispanics and African American population. Including 
 
County-level crime data comes from The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) published by the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program is a data collection effort designed to 
provide an overall view of crime in the United States. The data have been gathered by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) since 1930 and are compiled from law enforcement agencies on a monthly basis. 
By 2000, there were 19,655 law enforcement agencies contributing reports either directly or through their 
state reporting programs to UCR. The county level UCR files were aggregated to the county level and 
archived at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD), part of the Inter-University 
Consortium on Political and Social Research of the University of Michigan. We use the data collection 
containing county level counts of arrests and offenses for violent crime. Violent crime includes homicide 
(and non-negligent manslaughter), forcible rape, rape, robbery and aggravated assault.  
 
Considerable economic literature use UCR county-level data on crime
2
. According to Maltz (2006), this 
data is popular for two reasons; first, since 1977 county-level crime data has been publically available on 
NACJD website; and second, there is greater variation in demographic characteristics among counties 
than among either cities or states, thus permitting analysts to investigate additional relationships between 
crime and these characteristics. Nevertheless, in a series of papers, Michael Maltz (1999; 2003; 2006), 
and Maltz and Targonski (2002; 2004) find many problems with the accuracy and reliability of UCR 
crime data, especially that on county level. Maltz (1999, p. iv) states, “The quality of the data provided to 
the FBI, however, is uneven. Reporting to the FBI remains for many jurisdictions a voluntary activity; 
although many States now mandate that agencies report crime and arrest data to them (which they then 
forward to the FBI), even in those States local agencies do not always comply. Moreover, despite the 
efforts of the FBI to maintain their quality, there are many gaps in the data that make their use 
questionable”.  
 
In line with this conclusion, Maltz and Targonski (2004, p. 1) conducted a project to clean, annotate and 
make available UCR crime data. They end up producing data files of monthly crime counts from 1960 to 
2004 for the over 17,000 police departments in the US, for the seven Index crimes (murder, rape, robbery, 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Kovandzic and Vieraitis (2006), Grosjean (2011), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Lott 
and Mustard (1997), Hull and Fredrick (1995), Hull (2000), Grinols, Mustard and Staha (2011), Lott (1998; 2000). 
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aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) (Ohio State University, 2013). Although Maltz’s 
dataset offers more reliable crime statistics, it is limited by the large number of observations amputated. 
Moreover, as I aggregate monthly data on yearly basis, I use a strict standard of dropping a county’s3 
observations if a month (or more) observation is missing. Consequently, as the number of available 
observations for Maltz’s data is significantly limited, I use Maltz’s data for robustness check. Both UCR 
and Maltz’s data are merged with the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census data to obtain crime rates per 100,000 
people. 
 
Considering Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis, I account for historical inequality by using the Gini 
coefficient of land inequality in 1860, which is constructed by Nunn (2008) and is available online
4
. 
Following Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2002), I account for population 
density in 1860 as a proxy for initial prosperity. All 1860 data primarily comes from the 1860 Decennial 
Censuses of the United States
5
. 
 
All data for the year 2000 are from the 2000 U.S. decennial census, except income data which comes 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Regional Economic Accounts (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2013). I use United States Census Bureau’s nine regional divisions to account for geographic differences 
among U.S. states (United States Census Bureau, 2013). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 
variables used. 
4. Results: UCR data 
The coefficient estimates and robust standard errors of model (I) are presented in Table 2. The results 
show that all of the estimated coefficients for fraction of population in slavery are positive and significant 
at the 1% level for the different years. Moreover, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are large. 
To illustrate, a one percentage point increase in fraction of slaves in 1860 translates to a 115% increase in 
violent crimes in 2000. Even when including regional and slave state dummies to check whether the 
relationship is being driven by differences across states, I find that violent crimes in 2000 increases by 
80.5% when fraction of slaves in 1860 increases by one percentage point. This is in line with the first 
hypothesis regarding the relation between slavery and violent crime. Note that while we find that this 
                                                          
3
 Maltz’s data was initially identified by FBI’s Original Agency Identifier (ORI). I use Law Enforcement Agency 
Identifiers Crosswalk for the year 2005 (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, 2006) to link ORI with Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) county code. 
4
 Data are available at Nunn’s Harvard university webpage (http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0). For more 
information regarding the construction of this measure, see Nunn (2008, S. 36-37) 
5
 Data can be accessed online at University of Virginia’s Historical Census Browser 
(http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/collections/) 
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relation persists across the decades, we cannot really strictly compare the estimated coefficients due to the 
differences of the numbers of observations between the years.  
 
Model (II) is estimated through the specifications in table 3, where I test the second hypothesis related to 
inequality as the channel of transmission between slavery and violent crime. In columns (1) and (2), I 
include the Gini coefficient of land inequality in 1860 as a further independent variable. In columns (3) 
and (4), I test several channels of transmission from slavery to crime, namely income per capita, poverty 
level and income inequality. Dummies for regional divisions and slave states are added to columns (2) 
and (4). Through all columns, the slavery variable remains positively significant at the 1% level. We also 
look at beta coefficients to assess the relative importance of explanatory variables. The beta coefficients 
for slavery remain the highest among the four columns, scoring 0.23 and 0.18 in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. When controlling for channels of transmission in columns (3) and (4), the beta coefficients 
reach 0.22 and 0.17 respectively. It can be seen that the three channels of transmission investigated at 
columns (3) and (4) minimally alter the effect of slavery on violent crime. Contemporary income per 
capita and Gini coefficient are both positive and highly significant, with the latter having a strong 
economic impact on violent crimes. Regarding land inequality, the results show that unequal distribution 
of land in 1860 has a positive and significant effect on violent crime in 2000. This goes in line with the 
second hypothesis regarding the long-term effect of initial inequality on violent crimes.  
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of model (III), where I control for other contemporary controls for 
the year 2000, namely population per square mile, unemployment rate, educational attainment, youth 
proportion, and proportion of Hispanics. I also control for proportion of African-Americans in columns 
(3) and (4). Dummies for regional divisions and slave states are added to even-numbered columns. As 
with previous models, the effect of slavery remains positive and highly significant at the 1% level, in line 
with our first hypothesis. Through the four regressions presented in this table, the effect of one percentage 
point increase in 1860 slave fraction correlates with a surge in violent crime in 2000 of a range between 
72%-117.8%. Although controlling for other variables for the year 2000, the effect of the 1860 land 
inequality remains significant and loses only a bit in magnitude. The results suggest that a one percentage 
point increase in Gini coefficient of land inequality in 1860 is associated with a 73-85% increase in 
violent crime in 2000. This indicates that large scale plantations in 1860 made the distributions of wealth 
and human capital unequal. Consequently, such inequality exerts a considerable effect on level of 
violence in its respective county. 
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Note that the former population density variable and the Gini coefficient are no longer significant when 
adding the further contemporary controls. The effect of the proportion of African-Americans is 
insignificant, suggesting that inequality created by the former institution of slavery is not transformed to 
contemporary violence through today’s proportion of African-Americans in a given county. Out of the 
contemporary controls, only the education attainment, proportion of Hispanics, and youth are significant, 
with the latter having the largest magnitude. As in the case of table 3, slavery fraction remains the 
variable with the highest beta coefficient across the four regressions, reaching 0.23, 0.18, 0.26 and 0.20 
respectively. This is again in line with the first hypothesis. 
5. Robustness check: Maltz data 
For robustness check, I rerun the regression models of tables 2 to 4 using data provided by Maltz (Ohio 
State University, 2013) for the reasons illustrated in section 3. As with table 2, table 5 shows that all of 
the estimated coefficients for fraction of population in slavery are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
The magnitude of slavery estimates is considerably large. Note that population density estimates are not 
significant in any regression model in this table using Maltz’s data. Regression results in table 6 are 
similar to table 3 for our variable of interest; the effect of slavery is positive and highly significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the effect of land inequality in 1860 is also positive and significant at 5% and 1% 
levels. As channels of inequality transmission are tested in columns (3) and (4), Gini coefficient retains its 
considerable importance. However, while contemporary income per capita is not significant in table 3, 
poverty in 2000 is positive and highly significant in table 6 using Maltz data.  
Regression results in table 7 are noticeably different from that in table 4. Slave fraction is highly 
significant in columns (1) and (2), controlling for other contemporary variables. However, slave fraction 
loses this significance when the percentage of black population is controlled for in columns (3) and (4). 
Unlike the results obtained from UCR data at table 4, the effect of slavery on violence seems to be 
transmitted across time through the percentage of black population. Other variations from the results in 
table 4 exist. Gini coefficient, youth population and proportion of population in poverty have a high 
economic and statistic significance.  
6. Conclusion 
What are the reasons behind the prevalence of violence in Southern USA? This question is central for 
many sociological and economic theories aiming to explain this phenomenon. While numerous studies 
speculate that the legacy of slavery may have a significant effect on violence, no study has empirically 
investigated this claim. This study is the first to provide such empirical investigation. I base my 
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theoretical background on the institutional approach emphasized by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). This 
approach profess that the roots of the different economic outcomes of the north and South of the USA are 
in their different levels of economic inequality in the 19th century. The main conclusion of this paper is 
that slavery has a significant and positive long-term effect on the incidence of violent crime. The effect is 
robust across the two datasets used.  
 
As suggested by Engerman and Sokoloff, historic inequality plays a major role in impacting economic 
outcome in the long run. In our case, historic inequality is associated with contemporary violence. The 
results show that land inequality in 1860 is a strong determinant of violent crime in 2000. This relation is 
robust using Maltz dataset. Nevertheless, land inequality loses its significance when further contemporary 
controls are introduced in the model. As slavery was specifically targeted to black population, I test 
whether the violence black population faced during their enslavement until 1863 affected their tendency 
towards violence in their specific counties. I find that black population did not affect violence when 
historic slavery is controlled for. Nevertheless, this result is not found to be robust using Maltz data.  
 
To conclude, it is interesting to note that although Nisbett and Cohen (1996) view the legacy of slavery as 
one of the four reasons behind the prevalence of violence in the South, it remains the only factor that has 
not been empirically tested so far. This study fills this gap in the literature and provides evidence that the 
prevalence of violence in South USA can be explained by institutions generated due to historic slavery. 
As other studies argue that the culture of honor is an important factor behind Southern violence, further 
research is needed to empirically investigate the combined effect of culture of honor and slavery on 
Southern US violence. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and sources of the variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) UCR (2000) 
2633 6.524 0.990 1.894 11.600 
In Logs 
County-level data 
Uniform Crime Reports- U.S. Department of Justice-
Federal Bureau of investigation. Population statistics from 
U.S. Decennial Census. 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) UCR (1990) 
2777 6.117 1.084 0.697 11.540 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) UCR (1980) 
2839 5.540 1.096 1.338 11.378 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) UCR (1970) 
2179 4.252 1.096 0.091 7.154 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) Maltz (2000) 
834 5.264 0.886 2.145 8.759 
In Logs 
County-level data 
Michael Maltz's Revisions on UCR data. Data can 
be downloaded from: 
http://cjrc.osu.edu/researchprojects/hvd/usa/ucrfbi/ 
Population statistics from U.S. Decennial Census. 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) Maltz (1990) 
1032 5.227 0.955 2.136 8.148 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) Maltz (1980) 
1327 5.008 1.005 1.743 7.814 
Violent crime (per 100,000 population) Maltz (1970) 
860 4.496 1.019 1.171 7.597 
Fraction slaves per county (1860) 2014 0.156 0.216 0 0.925 Nunn (2008), U.S. Decennial Census. 
Gini coefficient of land inequality (1860) 1933 0.432 0.074 0.044 0.643 
Nunn (2008), Land area for U.S. states and counties are 
from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006). 
Population density (1860) 2033 0.551 8.016 0 353.769 Nunn (2008), U.S. Decennial Census. 
Gini (2000) 3109 0.434 0.038 0.314 0.605 GeoDa Center for Geospatial Analysis and Computation 
Log (Income per capita) (2000) 3110 10.021 0.225 8.917 11.360 Nunn (2008), U.S. Decennial Census. 
Poverty (2000) (proportion of population poverty status is 
determined) 
3106 0.964 0.046 0.313 1.047 U.S. Decennial Census 
Population per square mile (2000) 3138 243.73 
                         
1,666.86    
                               
0      
                     
66,834.60    U.S. Decennial Census 
Blacks (proportion of population) (2000) 3106 0.864 0.144 0 0.868 U.S. Decennial Census 
Hispanics (proportion of population) (2000) 3106 0.062 0.121 0.001 0.972 U.S. Decennial Census 
Unemployment rate (2000) 3138 5.812 2.860 0 41.700 U.S. Decennial Census 
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Youth (2000) (proportion of population aged 18-34) 3106 0.209 0.046 0.047 0.513 U.S. Decennial Census 
Educational Attainment (proportion of population with at 
least a high school degree) (2000) 
3105 0.507 0.070 0.160 0.737 U.S. Decennial Census 
Slave state dummy (1860) 3361 0.334 0.472 0 1 U.S. Decennial Census 
Regional division dummy 3138 5.526 2.872 1 9 
United States Census Bureau,  
Division 1: (New England) Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut.  
Division 2 (Mid-Atlantic) New York, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey 
Division 3 (East North Central) Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio 
Division 4 (West North Central) Missouri, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa 
Division 5 (South Atlantic) Delaware, Maryland, District of 
Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Florida 
Division 6 (East South Central) Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Alabama 
Division 7 (West South Central) Oklahoma, Texas, 
Arkansas, Louisiana 
Division 8 (Mountain) Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, 
Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico 
Division 9 (Pacific) Alaska, Washington, Oregon, 
California, Hawaii 
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Table 2: Slavery and violent crime across time (UCR) 
VARIABLES 
Log (violent crime per 100,000 population) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2000 2000 1990 1990 1980 1980 1970 1970 
         
Fraction slaves (1860) 1.155*** 0.805*** 0.716*** 1.341*** 0.998*** 1.328*** 1.588*** 1.217*** 
 (0.101) (0.137) (0.114) (0.158) (0.111) (0.155) (0.143) (0.193) 
Population density (1860) 0.0919*** 0.150*** 0.252*** 0.281*** 0.322*** 0.335*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0375) (0.0580) (0.0733) (0.0798) (0.0894) (0.0505) (0.0492) 
Constant 6.308*** 6.090*** 5.927*** 5.792*** 5.302*** 5.241*** 3.901*** 3.929*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0547) (0.0351) (0.0603) (0.0386) (0.0628) (0.0379) (0.0560) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 1,674 1,674 1,856 1,856 1,879 1,879 1,472 1,472 
R-squared 0.069 0.083 0.032 0.077 0.057 0.069 0.088 0.097 
F-Test F(2,1671)=68.43*** F(4,1669)=45.13*** F(2,1853)=27.59*** F(4,1851)=34.38*** F(2,1876)=46.07*** F(4,1874)=29.61*** F(2,1469)=68.48*** F(4,1467)=38.66*** 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Testing channels of transmission between slavery and violent crime (UCR) 
 Log (violent crime per 100,000 population), 2000 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Fraction slaves (1860) 1.023*** 0.818*** 0.991*** 0.777*** 
 (0.105) (0.138) (0.113) (0.140) 
Gini coefficient of land inequality (1860) 1.307*** 1.222*** 1.098*** 1.011*** 
 (0.309) (0.311) (0.310) (0.311) 
Population density (1860) 0.0670** 0.116*** -0.0136 0.0348 
 (0.0271) (0.0318) (0.0403) (0.0316) 
Gini (2000)   3.072*** 2.685*** 
   (0.731) (0.732) 
Log (Income per capita) (2000)   0.670*** 0.703*** 
   (0.128) (0.128) 
Poverty prop. (2000)   0.361 0.490 
   (0.403) (0.404) 
Constant 5.780*** 5.620*** -2.510* -2.971** 
 (0.132) (0.135) (1.424) (1.404) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 
R-squared 0.079 0.090 0.101 0.112 
F-Test F(3,1593)=49.99*** F(5,1591)=39.31*** F(6,1590)=29.48*** F(8,1588)= 29.42*** 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Slavery and violent crime-more contemporary controls (UCR) 
VARIABLES 
Log (violent crime per 100,000 population), 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Fraction slaves (1860) 1.178*** 0.917*** 1.106*** 0.720*** 
 (0.121) (0.142) (0.182) (0.209) 
Gini coefficient of land inequality (1860) 0.831*** 0.738** 0.847*** 0.768** 
 (0.308) (0.309) (0.308) (0.307) 
Population density (1860) -0.00827 0.0626 -0.00739 0.0680 
 (0.0782) (0.0819) (0.0783) (0.0817) 
Gini (2000) 1.183 0.380 1.105 0.130 
 (0.821) (0.842) (0.839) (0.869) 
Population per square mile (2000 4.15e-05 1.42e-05 3.48e-05 -3.60e-06 
 (9.27e-05) (9.20e-05) (9.37e-05) (9.37e-05) 
Unemployment rate  (2000) 0.0204 0.0360** 0.0185 0.0325** 
 (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0158) 
Educational Attainment prop. (2000) 1.816*** 2.179*** 1.830*** 2.252*** 
 (0.506) (0.551) (0.506) (0.555) 
Hispanics prop. (2000) 1.566*** 1.306*** 1.598*** 1.377*** 
 (0.307) (0.314) (0.316) (0.326) 
Black prop. (2000)   0.142 0.355 
   (0.309) (0.315) 
Poverty prop. (2000) 0.481 0.550 0.477 0.536 
 (0.464) (0.488) (0.466) (0.495) 
Youth prop. (2000) 2.992*** 3.283*** 2.975*** 3.251*** 
 (0.528) (0.536) (0.528) (0.536) 
Constant 3.254*** 3.052*** 3.288*** 3.132*** 
 (0.552) (0.565) (0.561) (0.580) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 
R-squared 0.124 0.134 0.125 0.135 
F-Test F(10,1586)=25.12*** F(12,1584)=24.30*** F(11,1585)=22.98*** F(13,1583)=22.50*** 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Slavery and violent crime across time (Maltz) 
VARIABLES 
Log (violent crime per 100,000 population) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2000 2000 
(+ dummy variables) 
1990 1990 
(+ dummy 
variables) 
1980 1980  
(+ dummy 
variables) 
1970 1970 
(+ dummy variables) 
         
Fraction slaves (1860) 0.863*** 0.794*** 1.209*** 1.332*** 1.231*** 1.636*** 1.946*** 2.273*** 
 (0.179) (0.215) (0.177) (0.220) (0.148) (0.191) (0.199) (0.251) 
Population density (1860) 0.145 -0.239 0.347* 0.151 0.324 0.122 0.299 0.105 
 (0.272) (0.298) (0.194) (0.238) (0.212) (0.230) (0.194) (0.181) 
Constant 5.074*** 5.401*** 4.888*** 5.110*** 4.632*** 4.900*** 4.111*** 4.416*** 
 (0.0633) (0.125) (0.0601) (0.122) (0.0618) (0.110) (0.0690) (0.107) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 463 463 615 615 792 792 499 499 
R-squared 0.057 0.096 0.093 0.099 0.089 0.101 0.154 0.169 
F-Test F(2,460)=14.94*** F(4,458)=12.35*** F(2,612)=29.12*** F(4,610)=15.84*** F(2,789) =42.06*** F(4,787)=24.92*** F(2,496)=55.28*** F(4,494)=29.77*** 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Testing channels of transmission between slavery and violent crime (Maltz) 
 Log (violent crime per 100,000 population) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Fraction slaves (1860) 0.657*** 0.814*** 0.554*** 0.796*** 
 (0.177) (0.213) (0.177) (0.209) 
Gini coefficient of land inequality 
(1860) 
1.731*** 1.614*** 1.158** 1.295** 
 (0.524) (0.553) (0.528) (0.545) 
Population density (1860) 0.00554 -0.339 0.201 -0.0530 
 (0.274) (0.299) (0.261) (0.288) 
Gini (2000)   6.575*** 6.514*** 
   (1.162) (1.164) 
Log (Income per capita) (2000)   0.217 0.171 
   (0.213) (0.222) 
Poverty prop. (2000)   1.640*** 1.526*** 
   (0.553) (0.537) 
Constant 4.414*** 4.835*** -1.945 -1.068 
 (0.228) (0.256) (2.378) (2.432) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.073 0.096 0.162 0.176 
F-Test F(3,429)=11.28*** F(5,427)=9.20*** F(6,426)=14.38*** F(8,424)=11.58*** 
Notes: the table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Slavery and violent crime-more contemporary controls (Maltz) 
 Log (violent crime per 100,000 population) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Fraction slaves (1860) 0.654*** 0.904*** 0.245 0.523 
 (0.174) (0.204) (0.296) (0.342) 
Gini coefficient of land inequality 
(1860) 
0.625 0.863 0.742 0.911 
 (0.542) (0.552) (0.557) (0.558) 
Population density (1860) -0.255 -0.409 -0.252 -0.422 
 (0.272) (0.292) (0.271) (0.293) 
Gini (2000) 4.981*** 5.534*** 4.398*** 4.896*** 
 (1.164) (1.196) (1.243) (1.315) 
Population per square mile (2000) 0.00133*** 0.00134*** 0.00127*** 0.00127*** 
 (0.000338) (0.000374) (0.000337) (0.000372) 
Unemployment rate  (2000) 0.0315* 0.0160 0.0208 0.00805 
 (0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0209) 
Educational Attainment prop. (2000) -0.861 -1.504* -0.856 -1.284 
 (0.729) (0.874) (0.730) (0.883) 
Hispanics prop. (2000) -0.220 -0.102 -0.0596 0.0812 
 (0.500) (0.515) (0.515) (0.543) 
Black prop. (2000)   0.814* 0.707 
   (0.462) (0.509) 
Poverty prop. (2000) 2.286*** 2.413*** 2.354*** 2.386*** 
 (0.609) (0.615) (0.614) (0.622) 
Youth prop. (2000) 2.501** 2.378** 2.334** 2.243** 
 (1.103) (1.085) (1.102) (1.091) 
Constant 0.214 0.462 0.436 0.698 
 (0.780) (0.786) (0.817) (0.837) 
Slave state dummy (1860) No Yes No Yes 
Regional division dummy No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.234 0.246 0.241 0.250 
F-Test F(10,422)=13.34*** F(12,420)=11.09*** F(11,421)=12.24*** F(13,419)=10.31*** 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
